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Introduction
* 
In relation to the “fundamental freedoms” provided for by the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice has an 
ambitious approach. It has long rejected the idea that the provisions of the Treaty concerning the free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital were simply prohibitions on discrimination based on 
the origin of the economic factor in question. In numerous judgments over the years, it has developed 
the idea that the provisions in question forbid any restriction on the freedoms they protect, and that all 
measures which “prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise [of the freedom in question] 
must be regarded as such restrictions”,
1 even if they apply without distinction based on national 
origin. A restriction will be unlawful unless it is justified by overriding requirements relating to the 
public interest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective it pursues and does not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. 
Although this approach has been generally applauded, occasional voices have been raised to draw 
attention to certain dangers inherent in it. In the Caixa-Bank case, Advocate-General Tizzano pointed 
out that the Court was in danger of adopting a very broad approach to what constituted a “restriction”; 
if all measures rendering an economic activity less attractive were to be in principle forbidden, this 
would threaten all regulation, or at least all but the least restrictive. The Advocate-General pointed out 
that such a result would hardly be compatible with the scheme of competences envisaged by the 
Treaty, under which the Member States retain their competence to regulate economic activity, subject 
only to the Treaty’s prohibitions on discrimination and restrictions on the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms. In other words, an overly wide understanding of the nature of a “restriction” would have the 
surprising result that Member States had actually lost their regulatory competence, or at least that they 
had retained it only to the extent that their measures were approved by the Court of Justice.  
Others have expressed similar concerns over the years
2. Some of these authors
3 have pointed out 
that the scheme of the Treaty seems to indicate that the aim of the provisions on the fundamental 
freedoms is to outlaw protectionist State measures, and not to subject all Member State regulation to a 
control of its reasonableness. The broad “restriction” approach results in the latter control system, 
since it effectively covers all regulation
4, and allows it to stand only to the extent that it is judged 
                                                      
*    The author is Legal Adviser, European Commission. This paper was written while on sabbatical at the European 
University Institute, and its conclusions discussed at a workshop on Current Issues in Community Law concerning 
Member State Tax Measures organised in Florence under the aegis of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
in May 2007. The author expresses her gratitude for comments made on an earlier version by Jukka Snell, Peter Oliver 
and Giuliano Marenco. Remaining errors are of course her own. Opinions expressed are personal and do not necessarily 
reflect the position of the Commission.  
1  See, e.g., the judgment of the Court in Case C-442/02, Caixa – Bank France, judgment of 5 October 2004, at ground 11. 
2  Marenco, “Pour une interprétation traditionnelle de la notion de mesure équivalente à une restriction quantitative’’, 
Cahiers de Droit Européen (1984) p. 291 ; Defalque, Commentaire Mégret – Le droit de la CEE, 2
nd Ed. (1992) Vol. 1 at 
242-243; Chalmers, "Free Movement of Goods within the European Community: an Unhealthy Addiction to Scotch 
Whisky?", (1993) ICLQ, Vol. 42, Part 2 at 269; Schima, "Equivalent Effect Revisited: the European Court of Justice and 
Article 30 EEC", (1995) Austrian Journal of Public and International Law, Vol. 47 at 215; Snell and Andenas, « How 
far ? The Internal Market and Restrictions on the Free Movement of Goods and Services”, International and Comparative 
Corporate Law Journal, Vol 2, Issue 2, 2000, p. 239; Snell, “Goods and Services in EC Law – a Study of the Relationship 
between the Freedoms”, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
3   Marenco, Defalque, Snell and Andenas, op.cit. footnote 2. See in the same sense A.G. Poaires Maduro in Joined Cases C-
158 and 159/04 Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos et al. [2006] ECR I-8135. 
4    Since all regulation, by its nature, tends to impose some constraints, and therefore to produce effects, directly or 
indirectly, on economic activity. A number of authors have tried to limit the impact of the broad “restriction” approach by 
suggesting that it should not cover measures which do not directly affect access to the market, or which are too far 
removed from interstate trade, or which have too slight an effect on such trade. See for instance Oliver and Roth, “The 
Internal Market and the Four Freedoms”, CMLR 41: 407-441,2004; O’Keeffe and Bavasso, “Four Freedoms, One Market Karen Banks 
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appropriate. This raises problems of a constitutional nature, since the decision on the appropriateness 
of national regulation is shifted from the national to the federal level, ie to the level of the Court of 
Justice. These authors have proposed that the provisions on the fundamental freedoms should instead 
be read as prohibiting discrimination in the broadest sense: any measure which in any way, in law or 
in fact, puts a movement of goods, services, persons or capital between one Member State and another 
at a disadvantage in comparison with an equivalent operation within a Member State should be subject 
to scrutiny as to its justification, proportionality etc. Any measure, on the other hand, which has no 
such specific effect on movements across borders should be deemed to fall outside the scope of the 
rules on free movement. 
The analysis therefore goes beyond the strict language of the Treaty, which frequently refers to 
discrimination based on nationality or the principle of national treatment (see Articles 39, 43 and 50). 
The cases which have come before the Court over the years have shown that protectionism can be 
implemented just as much by measures which restrict outward movements (towards other Member 
States) as those which protect against inward displacements. Thus, difficulties put in the way of, say, a 
capital movement from the legislating Member State to another are just as much of a problem for the 
creation of the internal market as are obstacles placed in the path of incoming capital. This double 
nature of the transactions to be protected was anticipated by the authors of the Treaty in relation to 
goods, hence the coexistence of Articles 28 and 29. Article 56 makes no distinction, in relation to the 
free movement of capital, between restrictions imposed by the Member State in which the capital 
originates and that for which it is destined. In relation to the other economic factors, however, the 
Court has had to interpret provisions which, on their face, appear only to deal with the inward-moving 
transactions in order to make them apply also to the outward
5. This is entirely justified by the aim of 
the Treaty to outlaw protectionism in whatever form. It has also led to a necessary mutation in the idea 
of discrimination: discrimination based on nationality is of no relevance where it may be a national of 
the legislating Member State who is being blocked from going to establish himself in another Member 
State or from buying shares in a company based there. In order to cover all the operations which may 
fall under the four freedoms, the relevant question is therefore whether a national measure imposes a 
specific disadvantage on a movement between Member States in comparison with an equivalent 
operation on the national level. 
In relation to goods, the Court has gone some way towards accepting discrimination as its 
touchstone. The judgment in Keck
6, for all its faults
7, subjects to automatic scrutiny only measures 
which, by their nature, are likely to create extra problems for goods coming from other Member States 
(requirements as to size, composition, packaging etc), leaving all other national provisions free from 
interference unless they are shown to be in some way discriminatory. As regards the other freedoms, 
however, the Court seems to continue on its broad “restriction” path. The traditional reference to “all 
measures which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of [a fundamental freedom]” 
continues to appear, with minor variations, in judgments concerning the different freedoms, and it 
often seems that the Court requires no more than an effect on the pursuit of an economic activity in 
order to consider that a national measure is a restriction requiring scrutiny as to its justification. The 
(Contd.)                                                                   
and National Competence: in Search of a Dividing Line”, Judicial Review in European Union Law, Liber Amicorum in 
honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Kluwer Law International 2000. These ideas are however inherently vague, and give no 
clear guidance as to how any given measure should be assessed. 
5  In relation to freedom of establishment, see Case 81/87 Daily Mail [1988] ECR 5483, ground 16; as regards free 
movement of workers, Case C-18/95 Terhoeve [1999] ECR I-345, grounds 26-29 ; for freedom to provide services, Case 
286/82 Luisi and Carbone [ 1984] ECR 377, ground 16.  
6   Joined cases C-267 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 
7   The articles criticising this judgment are too numerous to be listed. The essential difficulty arises from the need to 
classify all measures as either rules relating to the characteristics of a product or as "selling arrangements". For a succinct 
criticism, see the Opinion of A.G. Poiares Maduro in Joined Cases C-158 and 159/04 Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos et al. 
[2006] ECR I-8135. The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax Measures 
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focus of the present article is on the application of this approach to the internal tax measures of 
Member States.  
Treaty Provisions Relating to Taxation 
The scheme of the Treaty clearly seems to indicate that, apart from legislation specifically regulating 
one or the other aspect of tax law, Community law is limited in this field to a rule against 
discrimination. 
There are two main Treaty provisions dealing with fiscal measures, Articles 25 and 90. Article 25 
prohibits customs duties on imports and exports in trade between the Member States, and charges 
having equivalent effect. This prohibition expressly includes customs duties of a fiscal nature. 
According to a long-established line of case-law
8, Article 25 covers all charges levied at the time of, or 
by reason of, importation, which are imposed specifically on an imported product but not on a similar 
domestic product. Even a charge imposed both on imports and domestically-produced goods may be a 
charge equivalent to a customs duty if the money raised is used to support activities which benefit the 
taxed national products but not the imports. In such a case, the apparently neutral charge may in fact 
impose a net tax burden only on the imports, since for the domestic products it corresponds to benefits 
received
9. In any event, Article 25 applies only to measures imposing a specific disadvantage on 
imports or exports. 
Article 90, first indent, prohibits Member States from imposing on the products of other Member 
States “any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed … on similar domestic products” 
(emphasis added). The second indent of Article 90 bans Member States from “[imposing] on the 
products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection 
to other products” (emphasis added). This provision is therefore concerned with discrimination in 
every sense, including the indirect protection of national production by the adoption of rules 
unfavourable to imports.
 The Court has had occasion to interpret Article 90 as a whole as a provision 
guarding against protectionism.
10 In Weigel
11, it said that 
Article 90 EC seeks to guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards 
competition between products already on the domestic market and imported products (ground 
66)
12. 
The Court has consistently interpreted Article 90, in accordance with its terms, as being limited to a 
ban on discrimination. As in the case of the fundamental freedoms, it has expanded the notion of 
discrimination to cover also tax disadvantages imposed on exports13. It thus aims to ensure that, as the 
authors of the Treaty clearly intended, Article 90 should catch all potentially protectionist national measures. 
It is true that the Court toyed for a while with the idea that national tax measures which were not 
discriminatory but which might be excessive and therefore constitute a barrier to the free movement of 
                                                      
8   Starting with Case 77/72, Capolongo v Maya [1973] ECR 611. See more recently Case C-517/04 Visserijbedrijf D.J. 
Koornstra v Productschap Vis [2006] ECR I- 
9   Where the charge imposed on domestic products cannot be fully set off against benefits received, the measure will fall to 
be examined under Article 90 as discriminatory internal taxation. Cf Visserbedrijf Koornstra, op cit footnote 8. 
10  See, for example, Case 15/81 Gaston Schul [1982] ECR 1409 at ground 26; Case 184/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 
2013 at ground 7; Joined Cases C-290 and 333/05 Akos Nadasdi and Ilona Nemeth, judgment of 5 October 2006, not yet 
reported, at ground 45 
11  Case C-387/01 Weigel v Finanzlandesdirektion fûr Vorarlberg [2004] ECR I-4981 
12  This was expanded on by the Court in its judgment in Case C-313/05 Brzezinski, judgment of 18 January 2007, not yet 
reported, at grounds 27-28. 
13  See, for instance, Case 142/77 Preben Larsen and Flemming Kjerulff [1978] ECR 1543 or Case C-234/99 Nygard [2002] 
ECR I-3657 Karen Banks 
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goods could fall to be dealt with under Article 2814. However, it seems to have thought better of this 
idea – see its judgment in Case C-383/01, De Danske Bilimportører.15 In any event, it is clear since 
Keck that, even if one could overcome the considerable objections to examining under the general ban 
on restrictions on the free movement of goods measures for which a lex specialis has been inserted in 
the Treaty, in any event a non-discriminatory national tax measure would no longer be considered a 
restriction on the free movement of goods. 
The focus on discrimination is maintained by the references to tax law in Article 58. This provision 
safeguards the application, in the context of the free movement of capital and payments, of certain 
fiscal measures, but specifies (in paragraph 3) that these “shall not constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments”. The meaning 
of “arbitrary discrimination” is fairly clear
16. As for the notion of a “disguised restriction on free 
movement”, this has to be understood in the light of the fact that certain restrictions of a fiscal nature 
are actually authorized by Article 58(1)(a) and (b), so that the reference to a “disguised restriction” 
cannot be to any kind of restriction: it must have a special meaning. The most obvious interpretation is 
that it refers to measures having a particular, though indirect (“disguised”) impact on the cross-frontier 
movements of capital or payments which are liberalised by Article 56, without being justified by the 
apparently legitimate aim pursued, ie measures which either are not really apt to attain the declared 
objective or which go beyond what is needed in order to achieve that aim. 
For the rest, the Treaty provides for the possibility of the harmonization of tax laws, on the basis of 
either Article 93 or 94, and always on the basis of unanimity
17. Fiscal provisions are specifically 
excluded from the possibility of harmonization by qualified majority offered by Article 95
18. 
Furthermore, Article 293, in providing for Member States to enter into negotiations with each other 
with a view to securing the abolition of double taxation within the Community, makes it clear that the 
Treaty has not affected the basic competence of Member States to determine their respective tax 
jurisdictions. 
In sum, the picture which emerges from the Treaty provisions is of an area of largely retained 
competences, subject only to certain rules against discrimination and the possibility of harmonization 
by unanimous vote of the Member States. Needless to say, however, the rules of the Treaty governing 
the four freedoms apply to all national taxation measures other than those covered by Article 90, 
whether these be direct taxes or indirect taxes on services. The classic statement of the Court is that  
Although, as Community law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall within the 
purview of the Community, the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless be 
exercised consistently with Community law 
19.  
                                                      
14  See its judgment in Case C-47/88, Commission v Denmark [1990] ECR I-4509 
15  Judgment of 17 June 2003, at grounds 40-42. 
16   The Court has explained several times that a difference in treatment will amount to arbitrary discrimination within the 
meaning of Article 58(3) if it applies to situations which are objectively comparable and is not justified by overriding 
reasons in the general interest – see, for instance, the judgment in Case C-319/02 Manninen, judgment of 7 September 
2004, not yet reported, at ground 29. 
17  It has been suggested (Triantafyllou, “La doctrine fiscale sous l’emprise du marché intérieur: vers une coordination de la 
fiscalité directe dans la Communauté européenne?”, Revue de Droit fiscal 2006, Hebdomadaire no 24) that Article 96 
could provide a suitable legal base for legislation concerning tax rates, which would therefore be adopted by majority 
voting, but this seems doubtful – if tax harmonization measures could be adopted on the basis of Article 96, the exclusion 
of fiscal measures from the scope of Article 95(1) would make little sense. It seems that Article 96 has to be understood 
as applying to very specific situations of harmful distortion of competition rather than to simple differences between the 
systems, or even the tax rates, of Member States. 
18  See Article 95(2). 
19  Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225 at ground 21. The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax Measures 
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It is in the application of the fundamental freedoms in this area that the Court sometimes seems to 
depart from discrimination analysis. It appears on occasion to follow its usual “restriction” reasoning 
(hereinafter referred to as the “obstacle approach”), and to examine the justification of national tax 
measures without first enquiring whether they have some extra impact on cross-frontier operations as 
against purely national transactions. This introduces a surprising inconsistency of method, depending 
on the precise form of taxation examined in a given case and, hence, the provision of the Treaty which 
has to be applied to it (ie Article 90 or a provision concerning a fundamental freedom). It is true that, 
in this field more than others, the Court frequently refers to discrimination analysis, and one may often 
find the hallowed statement that “discrimination arises through the application of different rules to 
comparable situations or the application of the same rules to different situations”.
20 However, in other 
cases there is no reference to discrimination, and indeed it is sometimes unclear what criteria the Court 
has applied in arriving at its conclusion
21. In what follows, an attempt will be made to analyse the 
various types of reasoning to be found in the Court’s caselaw concerning each of the rules on free 
movement. The purpose is to see whether there are common threads running through the different 
branches of the caselaw, and whether a consistent way forward can be suggested. 
Free Movement of Workers 
As with freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services
22, in this area the Court’s early 
caselaw is based on discrimination analysis. Starting with discrimination based on nationality, the 
judgments move on to cover differences in treatment suffered by a worker as a consequence of the 
exercise of the right to free movement. Although, therefore, in an overall sense this freedom is largely 
analysed in discrimination terms, there are nevertheless two judgments which rely on “obstacle” 
reasoning. However, even these can be explained (as to their result) in terms of discrimination analysis. 
Discrimination Based on Nationality 
In Biehl
23, the issue at stake was the application to a German migrant worker of a Luxembourg rule 
according to which repayment of overpaid tax was only possible if the taxpayer was resident in 
Luxembourg for the whole tax year. The Court first noted that  
Under Article 48(2 ) of the Treaty freedom of movement for workers entails the abolition of all 
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States, particularly with 
regard to remuneration (ground 11), 
and that  
The principle of equal treatment with regard to remuneration would be rendered ineffective if it 
could be undermined by discriminatory national provisions on income tax (ground 12). 
                                                      
20  See, eg Case C-80/94, Wielockx v Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen [1995] ECR I-2493, ground 17 or Schumacker op. 
cit. at ground 30.  
21  See in the same sense Lyal, “Non-discrimination and direct tax in Community law”, EC Tax Review 2003, p. 69; Farmer, 
“The Court’s caselaw on taxation: a castle built on shifting sands”, EC Tax Review 2003, p. 78; Snell, “Non-
discriminatory tax obstacles in Community law”, ICLQ vol 56, April 2007 p.339. Other authors either assert or appear to 
assume that all of the Court’s caselaw applying the fundamental freedoms in the tax field is based on the idea of 
eliminating discrimination without, however, proposing any explanation for the reasoning offered by the Court, which 
often has little to do with discrimination analysis., cf Teixeira, “Tax systems and non-discrimination in the European 
Union”, Intertax, volume 34, issue 2, 2006; Kotschy, “Le ‘test discrimination’ dans les libertés fondamentales – retour en 
arrière ou concept bien ciblé?”, Revue du Droit de l’Union Européenne 4/2006; Lenaerts and Bernardeau, 
“L’encadrement communautaire de la fiscalité directe”, Cahiers de droit européen, 2007, nos 1-2 . 
22  The pattern is different in the cases concerning free movement of capital. Judgments in this area commence in 1999, by 
which time the obstacle approach had started to make itself felt. 
23  Case C-175/88, Klaus Biehl [1990] ECR I-1779 Karen Banks 
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It then went on to analyse the Luxembourg rule in question as an indirect discrimination against 
taxpayers who were nationals of other Member States. As the Court put it, 
It is often such persons who will in the course of the year leave the country or take up residence 
there (ground 14). 
The measure was then examined as to its justification and found wanting. The Luxembourg 
authorities argued that the rule sought to avoid an unfair advantage being conferred on temporarily 
resident taxpayers who spread their annual income and thus their tax liability between two Member 
States, since they would then be taxed at a more favourable rate than that applied to the income of a 
resident taxpayer who, with the same annual income, had to declare all of it to the Luxembourg 
authorities, whether or not it originated in Luxembourg. However, the Court pointed out that the rule 
applied even where no income arose in the second Member State. It was therefore disproportionate 
and contrary to Article 48(2) – now 39(2). 
A similar “indirect discrimination” approach was adopted by the Court in Bachmann – concerning 
a Belgian rule subjecting the deductibility for income tax purposes of insurance contributions to the 
requirement that they had been made “in Belgium” – but the measure was found to be justified
24.  
A somewhat more sophisticated discrimination analysis is to be found in the judgment in 
Schumacker.
25 This case concerned the tax treatment of a Belgian working in Germany but living in 
Belgium, who was therefore subject to the régime of limited taxation in Germany, i.e. he was taxed 
only on that part of his income arising in that Member State. Certain tax benefits, such as the 
possibility of “income splitting” between spouses, which were available in Germany under the system 
of full taxation, were not enjoyed by persons subject to limited taxation. Mr. Schumacker contested 
this difference of treatment. The Court, consulted as to the incidence of Community law on the 
ensuing litigation, carried out a thorough discrimination analysis. First, it noted that disadvantages 
based on residence were likely to operate mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States. 
Therefore, said the Court, 
tax benefits granted only to residents of a Member State may constitute indirect discrimination by 
reason of nationality (ground 29). 
However, the Court then recalled that the same rule only has to be applied to comparable situations, 
and recognised that the situations of residents and non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable in 
relation to direct taxes. It is worth reproducing in full the Court’s reasoning in this regard, because it 
recurs regularly in later cases. At grounds 31-34, the Court said: 
In relation to direct taxes, the situations of residents and of non-residents are not, as a rule, 
comparable.  
Income received in the territory of a Member State by a non-resident is in most cases only a part of 
his total income, which is concentrated at his place of residence. Moreover, a non-resident' s 
personal ability to pay tax, determined by reference to his aggregate income and his personal and 
family circumstances, is more easy to assess at the place where his personal and financial interests 
are centred. In general, that is the place where he has his usual abode. Accordingly, international 
tax law, and in particular the Model Double Taxation Treaty of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), recognizes that in principle the overall taxation of 
                                                      
24  Since the “Bachmann justification” has since been put forward by many Member States in defence of their tax rules, it is 
worth recalling what it was. The Court accepted the argument that there existed a connection between the deductibility of 
contributions and the liability to tax of sums ultimately payable by the insurers: the loss of revenue resulting from the 
deduction of the contributions from taxable income was offset by the later taxation of pensions, annuities or capital sums. 
Where the contributions had not been deducted, the later payments were exempt from tax. In such a system, the Court 
reasoned, given the difficulties for a Member State to recover tax from an insurer based in another Member State, the 
need to ensure the cohesion of the tax system justified the difference in tax treatment of contributions
. 
25  op cit footnote 15 The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax Measures 
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taxpayers, taking account of their personal and family circumstances, is a matter for the State of 
residence.  
The situation of a resident is different in so far as the major part of his income is normally 
concentrated in the State of residence. Moreover, that State generally has available all the 
information needed to assess the taxpayer's overall ability to pay, taking account of his personal 
and family circumstances.  
Consequently, the fact that a Member State does not grant to a non-resident certain tax benefits 
which it grants to a resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory since those two categories of taxpayer 
are not in a comparable situation. 
In principle, therefore, Article 48 does not preclude the application of rules of a Member State 
under which a non-resident working as an employed person in that Member State is taxed more 
heavily on his income than a resident in the same employment. However, noted the Court, in a 
situation such as that of Mr. Schumacker, where the taxpayer in question received no substantial 
income in his Member State of residence and obtained the major part of his taxable income from his 
activity in the State of employment, the State of residence was not in a position to take account of his 
personal and family circumstances, and there was no objective difference between his situation and 
that of a resident taxpayer engaged in comparable employment. It was therefore not justified, in such 
circumstances, to apply different treatment as regards the taking into account for tax purposes of 
personal and family circumstances, and the Court considered that such different treatment was 
discriminatory. Having rejected the justifications for the different treatment put forward by the 
German authorities, the Court concluded that Article 48 precluded the application of the national rules 
in question in circumstances such as those of Mr. Schumacker. 
Discrimination Due to the Exercise of the Right to Free Movement 
Mr. de Groot
26 was a Dutch national and resident, fully taxable in the Netherlands (subject to the effect 
of various double tax conventions which provided for taxation in the State of employment as regards 
income arising there). He had worked in several Member States. In 1994, he received income relating 
to his work in four different Member States, including the Netherlands. In assessing him for income 
tax, and more particularly in determining the amount of relief to which he was entitled as a result of 
maintenance payments and to take account of his personal circumstances more generally, the 
Netherlands authorities applied a “proportionality rule” under which the allowances in question were 
deducted from the tax payable in the Netherlands only in proportion to the income received by the 
taxpayer in that Member State. The Dutch authorities took the view that it was a matter for the 
legislation of the other Member States of employment to make appropriate allowances when taxing 
Mr. de Groot on the income arising in those States. 
In its analysis of the case, the Court first recalled the obligation of the Member States to exercise 
their tax competence in accordance with Community law, and therefore to avoid “any overt or covert 
discrimination on the basis of nationality” (ground 75). It then went on, at grounds 76-80, to say the 
following: 
Any Community national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his nationality, has 
exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed in a Member 
State other than that of residence falls within the scope of Article 48 of the Treaty….  
Moreover, it is settled case-law that all of the Treaty provisions relating to the freedom of 
movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community nationals of 
occupational activities of all kinds throughout the Community, and preclude measures which 
might place Community nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic 
activity in the territory of another Member State (emphasis added). 
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Provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin 
to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom even 
if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned.  
Thus, even if, according to their wording, the rules on freedom of movement for workers are 
intended, in particular, to secure the benefit of national treatment in the host State, they also 
preclude the State of origin from obstructing the freedom of one of its nationals to accept and 
pursue employment in another Member State.  
Consequently, the fact that Mr. de Groot has Netherlands nationality cannot prevent him from 
relying on the rules relating to freedom of movement for workers as against the Member State of 
which he is a national, since he has exercised his right to freedom of movement and worked in 
another Member State”.  
The Court went on to observe that the application of the Netherlands rule concerning the 
proportionality factor was liable to discourage a Netherlands national from taking up employment in 
another Member State, since it resulted in a lesser tax advantage than that which would be enjoyed if 
the taxpayer received all his income in the Netherlands. The court noted that 
as a consequence of his exercise of his right to freedom of movement, [Mr. de Groot] forfeited part 
of the tax allowances provided for by Netherlands law to which he was entitled as a resident of the 
Netherlands (ground 91, emphasis added). 
As for the fact that the proportionality factor had been applied in accordance with the rules laid 
down in the various double tax treaties concluded by the Netherlands, the Court acknowledged the 
competence of the Member States to determine, in the context of bilateral agreements, the connecting 
factors for the purposes of allocating powers of taxation. However, it said, 
as far as the exercise of the power of taxation so allocated is concerned, the Member States must 
comply with the Community rules… and, more particularly, respect the principle of national 
treatment of nationals of other Member States and of their own nationals who exercise the 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.  
Rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings therefore constitute an obstacle to freedom of 
movement for workers which is, in principle, prohibited by Article 48 of the Treaty (grounds 94 
and 95, emphasis added). 
As to whether the obstacle (or, more accurately, the difference in treatment) was justified, the Court 
examined and rejected the various arguments put forward in this regard by the Netherlands authorities 
(and by the Belgian and German governments which intervened in support of them). Notably, it 
refused to accept the idea that it was for each taxing State to grant tax allowances in relation to the part 
of the taxpayer’s income taxed by it. The Court was thus led to expand upon its previous statements
27 
that it was, in principle, for the State of residence to take account of personal and family 
circumstances. It repeated that a taxpayer’s ability to pay tax, determined by reference to his aggregate 
income and personal and family circumstances, is easier to assess at the place where his personal and 
financial interests are centred, and that this is generally the place where he has his usual abode. 
Reference was also made to the fact that international tax law recognises that, in principle, the overall 
taxation of taxpayers, taking account of their personal and family circumstances, is a matter for the 
State of residence (ground 98). The Court now took account of the possibility that a Member State 
might arrange, by way of a double tax convention, for its responsibility in this respect to be taken on 
(in part) by another Member State, or that it might find that, without any agreement, a State of 
employment did grant advantages, in relation to that part of a taxpayer’s income taxed by it, based on 
his personal and family circumstances. In such a case, any possible remaining inequality of outcome 
would be the result, not of unequal treatment, but of the disparities in the national tax systems 
applicable in a given case. So long as no such situation existed however, it was for the Member State 
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of residence to ensure equal treatment as between a person earning all of his income in the 
Netherlands and a resident part of whose income was taxed by other Member States. 
In Schilling,
28 the tax measure at issue was a German rule limiting the possibility of deducting from 
taxable income expenditure incurred in respect of a household assistant in the form of contributions to 
a pension fund to cases where such contributions were made to the German pension insurance scheme. 
Mr. and Mrs. Schilling were German nationals who had moved to Luxembourg to work as officials of 
the European Communities. They had three children, and employed a household assistant in 
Luxembourg to help in taking care of them. They paid social security contributions in respect of the 
household assistant to the Luxembourg pension insurance scheme.  
Apart from his Community salary, which was subject to tax only under the special Community 
taxation system,
29 Mr. Schilling also had some income arising in Germany. Under the terms of Article 
14 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities, he was liable to 
pay German income tax on that part of his income. The German authorities refused to allow him to 
deduct from his taxable income the amount of his expenditure on the household assistant, on the 
ground that the contributions in question had not been made to the German pension scheme. 
Asked for a preliminary opinion on the impact on the German rule of Article 14 of the Protocol and 
of Article 48 EC, the Court first recalled the considerations set out at grounds 75-80 of its judgment in 
de Groot. It then noted the particular taxation régime applicable to civil servants of the European 
Communities, and went on to say that 
an official of the European Communities who is of German origin and who, while working in 
another Member State, maintains his habitual residence in his State of origin and employs a 
household assistant in that State, for whom he pays contributions to that State ' s statutory pension 
insurance scheme, is in a position to benefit from the tax deduction in issue in the main 
proceedings.  
In contrast, persons in the situation of Mr. and Mrs. Schilling, who have left their State of origin to 
work as officials of the European Communities in another Member State, are not normally in a 
position to benefit from that tax advantage."(grounds 33-34, emphasis added). 
Mr. and Mrs. Schilling were therefore being placed at a disadvantage because of their exercise of 
their right to free movement, and this was contrary to Article 48, in conjunction with Article 14 of the 
Protocol, unless the national provision in question could be justified. The Court examined a number of 
possible justifications, but found none of them valid. In particular, it noted that the purpose of the tax 
deduction in question was to help large families, to create additional employment, and to combat 
undeclared employment, and that there appeared to be no reason why these objectives could not just as 
well be achieved by allowing the tax deduction where the pension contributions had been made in 
another Member State. 
No Breach of the Rules on Free Movement in the Absence of Discrimination 
The Weigel case
30 concerned an Austrian tax on fuel consumption which was charged on first sale or 
registration of motor vehicles in Austria. The tax was made up of a basic tax, related to the value of 
the car at the time of the taxable event and to its fuel consumption, and of a potential 20% surcharge to 
compensate for the fact that certain taxable events were not subject to VAT, notably first-time 
registration of a vehicle in Austria. Mr. and Mrs. Weigel were German nationals who moved to 
Austria so that Mr. Weigel could take up paid employment there. Each of them imported a car as 
personal property. Having registered the cars in Austria, they were then required to pay the tax on fuel 
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consumption, both the base tax and the surcharge. They challenged this decision, and in the ensuing 
litigation the Court of Justice was asked for a preliminary ruling on the application to the case of the 
rules on free movement of workers, as well as of Articles 90, 23 and 25.  
The Court examined only the base tax in connection with the rules on free movement. In this 
regard, it started its analysis by recalling that those rules forbid not only discrimination based on 
nationality but also any “obstacles” to freedom of movement (grounds 51-52). However, it then went on: 
A rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings applies without regard to the nationality of the 
worker concerned to all those who register a car in Austria and, accordingly, it is applicable 
without distinction.   
It is true that it is likely to have a negative bearing on the decision of migrant workers to exercise 
their right to freedom of movement. 
However, the Treaty offers no guarantee to a worker that transferring his activities to a Member 
State other than the one in which he previously resided will be neutral as regards taxation. Given 
the disparities in the legislation of the Member States in this area, such a transfer may be to the 
worker’s advantage in terms of indirect taxation or not, according to circumstance. It follows that, 
in principle, any disadvantage, by comparison with the situation in which the worker pursued his 
activities prior to the transfer, is not contrary to Article 39 EC if that legislation does not place that 
worker at a disadvantage as compared with those who were already subject to it . (grounds 53-55, 
emphasis added). 
In other words, a national tax which puts the incoming worker at no greater disadvantage than any 
national worker cannot be impugned on the basis of the rules on free movement only because it 
imposes a cost on the migrant
31. 
It should be noted that the Court also looked at the impact on the Austrian measure of Article 90. It 
found the basic tax to be inoffensive so long as the method of assessing the “fair value” of a second-
hand imported car resulted in equal treatment with such cars already registered in Austria. It was only 
in relation to the surcharge that the Court identified a problem of discrimination since this charge was 
levied almost exclusively on imported second-hand cars, and the Court found it unacceptable to seek 
to eliminate in this way the competitive advantage otherwise enjoyed by such vehicles.  
The “Obstacle” Approach 
A very different type of analysis to those outlined above is to be found in the Court’s judgment of 15 
September 2005 in Case C-464/02, Commission v Denmark.
32 This case concerned the requirement to 
register, and pay tax on, any vehicle to be used on Danish roads by a Danish resident, subsequently 
softened into a requirement to pay the tax on a pro rata basis, reflecting the proportion of time during 
which the vehicle was to be used in Denmark. The Commission’s complaint centred on the situation of 
a Danish resident employed in another Member State, and whose employer put at his disposal a 
company car registered in the Member State of employment. Such an employer might be deterred 
from taking on a Danish resident as an employee, as it would have to apply to register the car in 
Denmark as well as in the Member State of employment, and it would have to pay the Danish tax on 
top of the tax already paid in the first Member State of registration.  
The Court first of all declared that, contrary to the arguments of the Danish government, the 
legislation at issue fell within the scope of the rules on free movement of workers. In this regard, it 
recited the formula reproduced above in relation to the de Groot case to the effect that measures which 
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“preclude or deter” a national of a Member State from exercising his right to free movement constitute 
an “obstacle” to that freedom even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the worker 
(ground 35). It went on to say that legislation which relates to the conditions in which an economic 
activity is pursued may constitute such an obstacle (ground 37). The Danish legislation on the taxing 
of motor vehicles therefore had to be examined under the angle of the freedom of movement of workers. 
Then, as to whether there was an obstacle to that freedom, the Court said the following:  
It is settled case-law that Article 39 EC prohibits not only all discrimination, direct or indirect, 
based on nationality, but also national rules which are applicable irrespective of the nationality of 
the workers concerned but impede their freedom of movement…. 
It is clear that the original scheme, in so far as it remains applicable, could, on account of the 
obligation to register in Denmark a company car made available to the employee by an employer 
established in another Member State, deter such an employer from taking on an employee resident 
in Denmark … and, consequently, impede access to such employment by residents in Denmark.  
As regards employees resident in Denmark who wish to pursue their principal employment in an 
undertaking established in another Member State, the amended scheme also impedes freedom of 
movement for those workers since it imposes additional costs in the form of a temporary 
registration tax.  
In so far as the undertaking established in another Member State bears those costs without being 
compensated, it is deterred from taking on an employee resident in Denmark in respect of whom 
the costs are higher than those borne for an employee who does not reside in that State. (grounds 
45-48, emphasis added).  
On this basis, the Court concluded that the Danish legislation, both in its original and in its 
amended version, constituted a restriction on the free movement of workers. It went on to examine the 
possible justification of the restriction. It found none for the original scheme, and considered the 
amended scheme justified only as regards cases where a car was to be used essentially in Denmark on 
a permanent basis. For the rest, Denmark’s claim that it was entitled to use the measure to prevent tax 
avoidance through the use of a company car registered in another Member State was not accepted. 
As regards the manner in which the Court arrived at its conclusion that there was a restriction 
needing to be justified, it will be noted that there is no mention of discrimination, or of any difference 
in the impact of the Danish measures on cross-frontier movements of workers as compared with 
national employment situations. The only comparison which is made is between the costs for an 
employer in another Member State in taking on as an employee a Danish resident or a resident on 
another Member State. But Denmark could not be held accountable for this difference in costs: it was 
responsible only for its own tax régime. In fact, in this case the Court seems to have considered as a 
restriction needing justification under Article 39 the simple fact that two tax and registration systems 
were simultaneously applicable to a given situation, with a consequent increase in costs for those affected. 
Essentially the same approach was followed by the Court in Case C-232/03, Commission v 
Finland.
33 
These cases can be rationalized by considering that a Danish worker wishing to work in a Member 
State other than Denmark had to face a difficulty which did not confront an equivalent worker seeking 
to work for a Danish employer: whereas, in the latter situation, the employer would have to register, 
and pay tax on, the company car only in Denmark, in the former it would be obliged to deal with two 
sets of obligations. Thus, the “outward” movement of workers suffered from a specific disadvantage in 
comparison with an internal employment relationship. The Court could have applied classic 
discrimination terminology, recalling that discrimination can consist not only in treating equivalent 
situations differently, but also in applying the same rule to different situations: by not taking account 
of the specificity of the circumstances of the migrant worker, and by imposing on him, without 
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sufficient reason, the same rule it applied to national work relationships, Denmark could be considered 
to have discriminated against workers choosing to earn their living in other Member States. 
 Undeclared Discrimination Analysis 
Case C-152/03, Ritter-Coulais
34, concerned a French-German couple who worked as teachers in 
Germany but lived in their house across the border in France. They were liable to income tax in 
Germany on their total income. Under the German tax rules, in assessing the tax rate account could be 
taken of so-called “negative income” associated with a house in Germany (relating to the absence of 
positive income from the letting of real estate). Mr. and Mrs. Ritter-Coulais applied to have account 
taken in the setting of the tax rate applicable to them of the “negative income” associated with their 
house in France, but this was refused – although any positive income would have been duly taken into 
account! They appealed against their tax assessment, and in the course of the ensuing litigation the 
Court of Justice was asked to advise on the application of Community law to the circumstances of the case. 
Since the national court had based its questions freedom of establishment and the free movement of 
capital, the Court had first to explain why the provisions relating to these freedoms were not 
applicable. It then went on to examine the relevance of the freedom of movement of workers. It 
pointed out that any Community national who, irrespective of his place of residence and his 
nationality, has exercised the right to freedom of movement for workers and who has been employed 
in a Member State other than that of his residence falls within the scope of Article 48. It followed that 
the situation of Mr. and Mrs. Ritter-Coulais, who worked in a Member State other than that of their 
actual place of residence, fell within the scope of that provision. 
In analysing the impact of Article 48 on the case under examination, the Court said the following: 
individuals such as the appellants in the main proceedings, who worked in Germany whilst 
residing in their own home in another Member State, were not entitled, in the absence of positive 
income, to have income losses relating to the use of their home taken into account for the purposes 
of determining their income tax rate, in contrast with individuals working and residing in their own 
homes in Germany. 
Even though the national legislation is not specifically directed at non-residents, the latter are more 
likely to own a home outside Germany than resident citizens. 
It follows that the treatment of non-resident workers under the national legislation is less 
favourable than that afforded to workers who reside in Germany in their own homes. 
Consequently, legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is, as a rule, contrary to 
Article 48 EC (grounds 35-38, emphasis added). 
The word “discrimination” never appears, nor is it clearly stated that the rule at issue creates a 
difficulty for a trans-national employment situation which does not exist in a purely national setting. 
However, the expressions underlined above make it extremely clear that it was the difference in 
treatment as between German residents and residents in other Member States which triggered the 
applicability of the rules on free movement. 
As for the German government’s attempt to argue that the rule was justified by considerations of 
fiscal coherence, the Court gave this short shrift, noting that such considerations could hardly be relied 
on in the case of a tax system which took account of positive income from a dwelling situated in 
another Member State in order to determine the applicable rate of taxation, but failed to take into 
account, for the same purposes, income losses from the same source. 
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Freedom of Establishment 
The cases concerned with this freedom, like those centred on free movement of workers, can first of 
all be broken down into cases where what is at stake is a failure to apply national treatment to 
nationals of other Member States (including companies having their registered office in such States) 
which establish themselves in the legislating Member State, and those involving a disadvantage 
inflicted on nationals/residents (including nationally-based companies) because of their exercise of 
their freedom to establish themselves in another Member State. Within each category, there are cases 
in which discrimination analysis is explicit in the Court’s judgment, and others in which it can be 
discerned floating just below the level of the reasoning. Not surprisingly, it tends to be closer to the 
surface in the cases concerning national treatment (“inward” establishment), whereas one finds more 
“obstacle” language (“hindering” and “dissuading”) in judgments dealing with particular difficulties 
encountered by those establishing themselves in Member States other than that creating the problem 
(“outward” establishment). Finally, there are a few cases deserving separate treatment because of the 
particularly ambiguous nature of the reasoning employed by the Court, which can leave a doubt as to 
which type of analysis was intended. 
Cases of Inward Establishment 
The first case in this category is the famous French “avoir fiscal” case
35 concerning a tax credit 
granted to shareholders receiving dividends from a French company, except where the recipient was a 
branch or agency of a company having its registered office in another Member State. The Court placed 
the case firmly on a discrimination footing, stating that 
Article 52 is … intended to ensure that all nationals of member states who establish themselves in 
another member state , even if that establishment is only secondary , for the purpose of pursuing 
activities there as a self-employed persons receive the same treatment as nationals of that state and 
it prohibits , as a restriction on freedom of establishment , any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality resulting from the legislation of the Member State. (ground 14, emphasis added). 
Having noted the difference in treatment as between companies
36 having their registered office in 
France and those based in other Member States and pursuing their activities in France through a 
branch or an agency, the Court then examined and rejected the arguments put forward by the French 
government in order to justify the difference in treatment. Most importantly, the Court observed that 
any attempt to argue that the position of a branch or agency of a foreign company was objectively 
different to that of a company having its registered office in France foundered on the fact that the 
French tax system treated these two categories in the same way for the purposes of taxing their profits. 
It was therefore discriminatory to treat them differently in relation to the tax credit. 
It is also important to note a further discrimination logic which is hidden in this case, since it recurs 
frequently (sometimes also hidden) in subsequent cases
37. In order to explain why the French tax 
system had to treat a branch or agency having no legal personality in the same way as a company 
established in France (including a subsidiary of a company having its registered office in another 
Member State which did benefit from the tax credit), the Court said the following: 
freedom of establishment , which article 52 grants to nationals of another member state and which 
entails their right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons under the conditions 
laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected , 
includes , pursuant to article 58 of the EEC treaty , the right of companies or firms formed in 
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accordance with the law of a member state and having their registered office , central 
administration or principal place of business within the community to pursue their activities in the 
member state concerned through a branch or agency . With regard to companies, it should be noted 
in this context that it is their registered office in the above-mentioned sense that serves as the 
connecting factor with the legal system of a particular state, like nationality in the case of natural 
persons. Acceptance of the proposition that the member state in which a company seeks to 
establish itself may freely apply to it a different treatment solely by reason of the fact that its 
registered office is situated in another member state would thus deprive that provision of all 
meaning (ground 18, emphasis added). 
At first glance, this seems to mean that Article 52 requires more than national treatment even in a 
case of “inward” establishment: since a company having its registered office in another Member State 
is absolutely entitled to choose its form of establishment in the legislating Member State, the latter is 
not entitled to distinguish in any way in the treatment it accords to a subsidiary of a foreign company 
and a branch of the same, irrespective of any distinctions it might make on the national level between 
legal entities and branches of such entities. Not a word is to be found in this judgment or the later ones 
concerning the same issue comparing the situation of the branch of the foreign company with that of a 
branch or agency of a nationally-based company. One could therefore conclude that, in these cases, the 
Court is applying a substantively “obstacle” approach. This does not however seem to have been the 
Court’s intention. The Commission had in fact based its case on the idea that there were two different 
aspects to it, a discrimination element concerning the differential tax treatment, and a “restriction” 
dimension due to the fact that the French rule put pressure on non-French companies to establish 
themselves in France via the creation of a subsidiary rather than by having recourse to a branch or 
agency. At ground 15 of its judgment, the Court gently rejected this approach, saying 
[…] The two submissions put forward by the commission , namely that concerning discrimination 
in French law against branches and agencies of insurance companies established in other member 
states vis-à-vis companies established in France and that concerning the restriction of the freedom 
of foreign insurance companies to establish branches and agencies , are closely linked . They must 
therefore be considered together, 
and went on to deal with both aspects using the language of equal treatment. It therefore seems fair to 
infer that the Court saw the less favourable treatment of a branch or agency of a company based in 
another Member State as compared to that accorded to a company registered in France as a species of 
discrimination. This may be rationalized by considering that, whereas the favourable tax treatment was 
available to all French companies, it was only available (indirectly) to companies having their 
registered office in another Member State where those companies had established a subsidiary in 
France, i.e. only to some of them. By the same token – and perhaps more importantly – it was not 
available to any company which retained its exclusively non-French “nationality”. One thus 
understands better the reference in ground 18 of the judgment, cited above, to the “nationality” of a 
company registered in another Member State. 
This idea of discrimination based on the place where a company has its seat appears explicitly in 
the later case of Royal Bank of Scotland v Elliniko Dimosio
38.
 This case concerned the higher rate of 
tax applied under Greek law to the Greek branch of a UK company as compared to that applicable to 
Greek banks. The Court adopted an entirely discrimination-based approach in this case, referring to 
“discrimination against companies having their seat in another Member State” (ground 30). This was 
after it had observed that, as in the French case, the Greek legislation made no relevant distinction 
between the Greek branch of a foreign-based company and a company having its registered office in 
Greece for the purposes of determining the taxable base, so that it was impossible to claim that the two 
kinds of entity were not in a comparable position when it came to setting the rate of tax. 
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The analysis is less clear-cut in Saint-Gobain.
39  This case also derived from a difference in 
treatment – this time under German tax law – of companies having their registered office in Germany 
and German branches of companies based in other Member States. The Court starts out on a clear 
discrimination track. At grounds 34-35, it says: 
[Articles 52 and 58] guarantee nationals of Member States of the Community who have exercised 
their freedom of establishment and companies or firms which are assimilated to them the same 
treatment in the host Member State as that accorded to nationals of that Member State.  
As far as companies or firms are concerned, their corporate seat, in the sense expressed above, 
serves to determine, like nationality for natural persons, their connection to a Member State's legal order. 
It then notes (ground 38) that, due to the difference in treatment referred to above, the permanent 
establishments in Germany of companies having their corporate seat in another Member State are in 
“a less favourable position than resident companies, including German subsidiaries of non-resident 
companies”. However, at ground 42, it states that the tax disadvantage suffered by German branches 
of non-resident companies 
restricts the freedom to choose the most appropriate legal form for the pursuit of activities in 
another Member State, which the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 52 of the Treaty 
expressly confers on economic operators. 
This sounds like the “obstacle” approach again. But the Court goes on (at grounds 43-44): 
The difference in treatment to which branches of non-resident companies are subject in 
comparison with resident companies as well as the restriction of the freedom to choose the form of 
secondary establishment must be regarded as constituting a single composite infringement of 
Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty.  
The question which must be examined therefore is whether that difference in treatment may be 
justified in view of the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of establishment (emphasis added). 
Both elements were therefore seen by the Court as aspects of differential treatment. It went on to 
examine whether this difference was justified and concluded that it was not, notably on the ground 
that, contrary to the arguments of the German government, there was no relevant difference as 
between resident companies and non-resident companies having a permanent establishment in 
Germany in relation to their liability to tax on dividend receipts in Germany from shares in foreign 
subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries and on the holding of those shares. It was therefore discriminatory to 
introduce a difference only as regarded the tax concessions in question. Here, and in the rest of the 
judgment, we seem to be back on a conventional non-discrimination track. 
Given the balance of emphasis in the judgment, it seems fair to conclude that the Court intended to 
adopt an overall “discrimination” approach, and that the reference to the absolute right of a company 
based in a Member State other than the host Member State to adopt the form of establishment it 
thought best has to be understood in the light of the fact that failure to treat a branch or an agency in 
the same way as a subsidiary, unless there is some objective reason for the differentiation, amounts to 
discrimination against a company having legal personality only according to the law of another 
Member State – in other words, on the basis of the “nationality” of the company. 
The same analysis seems to apply to the case CLT-UFA
40 which also concerned German tax rules 
which, through the operation of the distinction between companies fully taxable in Germany and those 
paying tax only on income arising in Germany, resulted in the payment of higher taxes by companies 
having their head office in another MS and operating in Germany via a branch than by similar 
companies which had established a subsidiary in Germany. At grounds 14-15, the Court says: 
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The second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 52 expressly leaves traders free to choose the 
appropriate legal form in which to pursue their activities in another Member State and that 
freedom of choice must not be limited by discriminatory tax provisions…  
Therefore, the freedom to choose the appropriate legal form in which to pursue activities in 
another Member State primarily serves to allow companies having their seat in a Member State to 
open a branch in another Member State in order to pursue their activities under the same 
conditions as those which apply to subsidiaries (emphasis added).  
One’s first reaction to ground 15 is to think “why”? Upon reflection, however, what the Court 
seems to mean is that, where a company chooses not to create a subsidiary in a Member State other 
than that in which it has its registered office, thus retaining the character of “foreign” company as far 
as the law of that Member State is concerned, it must not be discriminated against only because it has 
failed to create an entity having the “nationality” of the Member State of (new) establishment. 
In this case, as in the others, the Court found no relevant difference between the situation of a 
branch and a subsidiary of a non-German company, and therefore declared the German tax rule in 
question incompatible with Article 52. 
The judgments in the other cases on “inward” establishment all clearly hinge on the question 
whether an unjustified difference in treatment has been found to exist. The differences in question 
range from applying a higher rate of income tax to non-residents than to residents pursuing the same 
activity
41, through failing to allow a non-resident taxpayer to deduct from his taxable income an 
amount set aside to form a pension reserve
42, or the cost of tax advice
43 (whereas these deductions 
were afforded to resident taxpayers), to refusing to pay non-resident companies interest on the 
repayment of overpaid corporation tax
44, imposing an extra tax on dividends paid to a parent company 
where that company had its seat in another Member State
45, making the availability of beneficial tax 
treatment of the distribution of dividends to a parent company dependent on that company having its 
seat in the legislating Member State
46, or reserving to resident companies the availability of a tax 
credit on the receipt of dividends from a resident subsidiary
47. In the first five cases mentioned, the 
Court found no relevant difference in the situations of resident and non-resident taxpayers, and 
therefore declared the respective rules contrary to the principle of freedom of establishment. 
In Metallgesellschaft and ACT Test Claimants, the Court had to examine different aspects of the 
UK tax rules applicable to the distribution of dividends by a resident subsidiary. In Metalgesellschaft, 
the rule at issue reserved to resident subsidiaries the parent companies of which had their seat in the 
UK the possibility of opting for the “group income election regime” which allowed them not to pay 
advance corporation tax when distributing dividends to their parent companies. The Court found that 
there was no relevant difference between the purely national situation and that involving a 
transnational dimension such as to justify the difference of treatment.  
In ACT Test Claimants, the question was whether a Member State was obliged to grant to non-
resident parent companies the benefit of a tax credit granted to resident companies receiving dividends 
from their resident subsidiaries. The purpose of the tax credit in question was to avoid double taxation 
(first at the level of the company making the distribution, and then at that of the parent company). The 
effect of the provisions in question was that profits distributed by resident companies were taxed once 
                                                      
41  Case C-107/94 Asscher [1996] ECR I-3089  
42  Case C-80/94 Wielockx [1995] ECR I-2493 
43  Case C-346/04 Conijn [2006] ECR I-6137 
44  Case C-330/91 Commerzbank [1993] ECR I-4017 
45  Case C-170/05 Denkavit , judgment of 14 December 2006, not yet reported. 
46  Joined cases C-397 and 410/98 Metallgesellschaft [2001] ECR I-1727 
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at company level. The Court found that the position of the non-resident company receiving dividends 
from a resident subsidiary was not the same as that of a resident company receiving such dividends, or 
rather that the Member State in which the distributed profits were derived did not stand in the same 
relationship to the two categories of company. To require the Member State in which the profits were 
generated to grant the tax credit in question to a non-resident company receiving dividends from a 
resident company would amount to obliging it to abandon its right to tax a profit generated through 
economic activity undertaken on its territory (ground 59 of the judgment), since the tax credit would 
cancel the benefit of the tax received from the resident company. 
In all these cases, the Court’s analysis of the national measures under examination is characterized 
by references to unjustified (or, once, justified) differences of treatment. The principle of freedom of 
establishment is almost always explicitly presented in terms of a prohibition of discrimination. It is 
true that, in Denkavit, after stating that the difference in the tax treatment of dividends between parent 
companies, based on the location of their registered office, was in principle prohibited by the rules on 
freedom of establishment, and before going on to examine any possible justification of the different 
treatment, the Court remarked, at Ground 30 of the judgment: 
The tax measure at issue in the main proceedings makes it less attractive for companies established 
in other Member States to exercise freedom of establishment and they may, in consequence, 
refrain from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in the State which adopts that measure. 
The meaning of this is not very clear. In the absence of any indication as to the tax treatment of 
dividends in the hands of parent companies by other Member States, how can one say that the French 
rules could act as a disincentive to establishment in France? One could therefore see the quoted 
sentence as an indication of “obstacle” reasoning, suggesting that any measure which adds a burden to 
the operation of establishment is to be seen as a restriction, and therefore prohibited unless justified. 
This however would be very odd in the context of a judgment so clearly centred on a difference in 
treatment as between a purely national and a transnational economic relationship. It seems that one has 
to understand that the Court was assuming that all Member States apply rules to avoid double taxation 
as between parents and subsidiaries, so that for a parent company to find itself in a double taxation 
bind because its subsidiary was established in another Member State would amount to a 
discouragement of the transnational scenario. So even this reference to a measure “making less 
attractive” the exercise of a fundamental freedom has to be seen as forming part of the Court’s 
consistent application of discrimination reasoning in this part of the caselaw. 
Cases of Outward Establishment 
These cases cover a wide spectrum of tax rules, ranging from penalties imposed when a taxpayer 
changes his tax residence to another MS
48, through an extraordinary variety of tax disadvantages 
suffered by parent companies having a subsidiary based in another Member State
49, or by the 
subsidiary itself
50, to problems encountered by individual taxpayers having a controlling holding in a 
company having its registered office in another Member State
51. In most of the judgments, the Court 
starts its legal analysis by presenting the principle of freedom of establishment in an apparently very 
broad way. It typically says that: 
                                                      
48  Case C-9/02 De Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I-2409, Case C-470/04 N. [2006] ECR I-7409  
49  Case C-264/96 ICI [1998] ECR I-4695, Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995, Case C-471/04 Keller 
Holdings [2006] ECR I-2107, Case C-446/03 Marks and Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837, Case C-168/01 Bosal [2003] ECR 
I-9409, Case 446/04 FII Test Claimants, judgment of 12 December 2006, not yet reported, Case C-347/04 Rewe 
Zentralfinanz, judgment of 29 March 2007, not yet reported. 
50  Also Case 446/04 FII Test Claimants 
51  Case C-436/00 X and Y [2002] ECR I-10829, Case C-251/98 Baars [2000] ECR I-2787 Karen Banks 
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even though, according to their wording, the provisions concerning freedom of establishment are 
directed mainly to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in the host Member 
State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from 
hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company 
incorporated under its legislation( ICI, ground 21, emphasis added). 
This sounds as if any measure imposing any burden whatsoever on the establishment of a Member 
State’s national in another Member State will be contrary to the Treaty unless justified. However, it 
subsequently emerges clearly in all the judgments that it is the difference between the tax treatment of 
a purely national situation and one resulting from the exercise of freedom of establishment in another 
Member State which leads the Court to examine the justification of the national rule in question.  
There are of course quite substantial variations in the ways in which the Court articulates its 
reasoning. Very frequently, it explains (more or less clearly) the difference in treatment as between the 
national and the transnational situation, and then makes a specific link between the disadvantage 
incurred by the person having exercised his/its right to freedom of establishment and the consequent 
potential discouragement of such establishment. A particularly clear explanation was given in de 
Lasteyrie,  which concerned a French rule according to which a taxpayer who owned company 
securities and who transferred his tax residence abroad was taxable at that date for any increase in 
value in the securities between the date of acquisition and the date of transfer. At ground 46 of the 
judgment in that case, the Court said: 
A taxpayer wishing to transfer his tax residence outside French territory, in exercise of the right 
guaranteed to him by Article 52 of the Treaty, is subjected to disadvantageous treatment in 
comparison with a person who maintains his residence in France. That taxpayer becomes liable, 
simply by reason of such a transfer, to tax on income which has not yet been realised and which he 
therefore does not have, whereas, if he remained in France, increases in value would become 
taxable only when, and to the extent that, they were actually realised. That difference in treatment 
concerning the taxation of increases in value, which is capable of having considerable 
repercussions on the assets of a taxpayer wishing to transfer his tax residence outside France, is 
likely to discourage a taxpayer from carrying out such a transfer (emphasis added). 
Likewise, in X and Y, the Court presented one of the national tax rules under examination in that 
case in the following way: 
the national provision at issue in the main proceedings entails a difference in treatment in refusing 
to the transferor the benefit of deferring capital gains tax made on shares transferred at undervalue, 
with a consequential cash flow disadvantage for him, where the transferee company in which the 
transferor has a holding is established in another Member State. Therefore, refusal of the tax 
advantage in question on the ground that the transferee company in which the taxpayer has a 
holding is established in another Member State, is likely to have a deterrent effect on the exercise 
by that taxpayer of the right conferred on him by Article 43 EC to pursue his activities in that other 
Member State through the intermediary of a company (ground 36, emphasis added). 
Similar reasoning is to be found in the judgment in Keller
  (grounds 34-35) and in Rewe 
Zentralfinanz (grounds 30-31). 
A more condensed presentation of the same logic is to be found in other judgments, such as that 
given in Marks and Spencer. That case centred on a UK tax rule which allowed a resident parent 
company to reduce its taxable income by setting off losses incurred by its subsidiaries only where the 
latter were also resident in the UK. Having explained the advantage to a company of the “group relief” 
at issue in the case, the Court went on: 
The exclusion of such an advantage in respect of the losses incurred by a subsidiary established in 
another Member State which does not conduct any trading activities in the parent company’s 
Member State is of such a kind as to hinder the exercise by that parent company of its freedom of 
establishment by deterring it from setting up subsidiaries in other Member States. The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax Measures 
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It thus constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment within the meaning of Articles 43 EC 
and 48 EC, in that it applies different treatment for tax purposes to losses incurred by a resident 
subsidiary and losses incurred by a non-resident subsidiary (grounds 33-34, emphasis added).  
In other cases, the Court focuses the key passages of its reasoning on the difference in treatment as 
between the national and transnational economic scenario, with only a ritual mention of “hindering” or 
“discouragement” of the exercise of the freedom of establishment. In ICI, the Court was asked to 
pronounce on the compatibility with Community law of a national tax rule which reserved 
“consortium relief” to companies controlling, wholly or mainly, subsidiaries having their seats in the 
national territory. After the passage from ground 21 of the judgment quoted above, the Court went on: 
It should be noted here that, under the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, companies 
belonging to a resident consortium which have, through a holding company, exercised their right 
to freedom of establishment in order to set up subsidiaries in other Member States are denied tax 
relief on losses incurred by a resident subsidiary where the majority of the subsidiaries controlled 
by the holding company have their seat outside the United Kingdom.  
Such legislation, therefore, applies the test of the subsidiaries' seat to establish differential tax 
treatment of consortium companies established in the United Kingdom. Consortium relief is 
available only to companies controlling, wholly or mainly, subsidiaries whose seats are in the 
national territory.  
It is therefore necessary to determine whether there is any justification for such inequality of 
treatment under the Treaty's provisions on freedom of establishment (grounds 22-24, emphasis added). 
In Baars, the national rule contested was a Dutch provision which granted a tax advantage to 
Netherlands residents having a holding in a company only if the company was established in the 
Netherlands. Mr Baars held a controlling holding in an Irish company, and accordingly was not 
allowed to claim the relative tax advantage. In relation to this, after the usual recital of the aims of the 
rules on freedom of establishment, the Court said the following: 
By refusing to grant the tax advantage …. to nationals of Member States residing in the 
Netherlands who, in exercise of their right of free establishment, manage a company having its 
seat in a Member State other than the Netherlands, while granting that advantage to nationals of 
Member States residing in the Netherlands who hold a substantial holding in a company having its 
seat in the Netherlands, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings provides for a 
difference in treatment between taxpayers by adopting as its criterion the seat of the companies of 
which those taxpayers are shareholders. 
That difference in the treatment of taxpayers is in principle contrary to Article 52 of the 
Treaty(grounds 30-31, emphasis added). 
Finally, in FII Test Claimants, the Court had to pronounce on the compatibility of a whole series of 
tax provisions with Community law. The common thread running through a long and complex 
judgment is its focus on discrimination. Thus, in relation to national rules aiming to avoid double 
taxation in the case of a distribution of dividends by a subsidiary to a resident parent company and 
using different mechanisms to that end according to whether the subsidiary was based in the national 
territory or not, the Court said: 
whatever the mechanism adopted for preventing or mitigating the imposition of a series of charges 
to tax or economic double taxation, the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty preclude 
a Member State from treating foreign-sourced dividends less favourably than nationally-sourced 
dividends, unless such a difference in treatment concerns situations which are not objectively 
comparable or is justified by overriding reasons in the general interest(ground 46, emphasis added). 
On the basis of this statement of principle, the Court found that it was not contrary to the Treaty for 
a Member State to exempt dividends from tax in the hands of the parent company when they are paid 
by a resident subsidiary (which is, in principle, liable for corporation tax at the same rate as the parent) 
while taxing such dividends when paid by a non-resident subsidiary but offsetting against the amount 
payable the corporation tax already paid by the subsidiary (in its home Member State ) on the Karen Banks 
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underlying profits. What mattered was that the legislating Member State should genuinely avoid 
double taxation in both situations. 
Again, with regard to a particularity of UK law consisting in the advance payment of corporation 
tax (“ACT”) on the payment of dividends, and the granting of a tax credit to a parent company 
receiving dividends on which ACT had been paid by its subsidiary so that, on a subsequent 
distribution of dividends by the parent to its own shareholders, it did not have to pay ACT, the Court 
carried out a step by step discrimination analysis. It first noted (ground 82) the differential impact of 
the rule in question according to whether dividends were paid to a parent by a resident or non-resident 
subsidiary (only resident subsidiaries being liable to pay ACT). It then observed (ground 84) that the 
fact of not having to pay ACT represented a cash-flow advantage, in so far as the company concerned 
could retain the sum which it would otherwise have had to pay by way of ACT until such time as 
corporation tax became payable in the normal way. The Court continued its analysis by examining the 
argument of the UK authorities that there was no discrimination in the case, since credit for ACT 
could only be given where ACT had in fact been paid, and since no non-resident company was liable 
for this form of tax, it was logical that the credit in question should only be given in the case of 
distribution of dividends by resident subsidiaries who had in fact paid it. The Court was not impressed. 
It considered that 
[c]ontrary to what the United Kingdom Government contends, a company receiving foreign-
sourced dividends is, seen in the light of the objective of preventing the imposition of a series of 
charges to tax which the legislation at issue in the main proceedings seeks to avoid, in a 
comparable situation to that of a company receiving nationally‑ sourced dividends, even though 
only the latter receives dividends on which ACT has been paid (ground 87, emphasis added). 
This was because ACT is nothing other than corporation tax paid in advance, while companies 
having their seat outside the UK are also liable for ordinary corporation tax. It followed that 
[s]ince both resident companies distributing dividends to other resident companies and non-
resident companies making such a distribution are subject, in the State in which they are resident, 
to corporation tax, a national measure which is designed to avoid a series of charges to tax on 
distributed profits only as regards companies receiving dividends from other resident companies, 
while exposing companies receiving dividends from non-resident companies to a cash-flow 
disadvantage, cannot be justified by a relevant difference in the situation of those companies 
(ground 91, emphasis added). 
Nor could the difference in treatment be justified by arguments about the coherence of the tax 
system. The national measure in question was therefore precluded by the rules on freedom of 
establishment. 
The same kind of reasoning was applied systematically to various other features of UK corporate 
tax law, some of which were found to be discriminatory and some not. 
Ambiguous cases 
There are a few cases, concerning both “inward” and “outward” establishment, where the Court’s 
reasoning seems to hover between a discrimination-based approach and one focused on the existence 
of an obstacle to freedom of establishment. The Denkavit judgment has already been mentioned in this 
connection. The phenomenon is even more marked in Futura Participations
52, Lankhost-Hohorst
53, 
Thin Cap Test Claimants
54 and Bosal
55.  
                                                      
52  Case C-250/95 [1997] ECR I-2471 
53  Case C-324/00 [2002] ECR I-11779 
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Futura concerned the rules applicable in Luxembourg to the taxation of non-resident companies 
operating in Luxembourg through a branch. Such companies were taxable only on income earned by 
their locally-based permanent establishments. They could deduct from their net income losses carried 
forward from previous years provided that these were “economically related to income received 
locally” and that separate accounts for the local branch were kept in Luxembourg according to 
Luxembourg accounting rules. The Court was asked about the compatibility with Community law of 
both conditions. As regards the first one, it recalled the obligation of the MSS to exercise their taxation 
competence consistently with Community law and therefore to avoid “any overt or covert 
discrimination on grounds of nationality”(ground 19). It then noted that, for non-resident taxpayers, 
only profits and losses arising from their Luxembourg activities were taken into account in calculating 
the basis on which they were assessed to tax. The Court therefore concluded, at ground 22, that 
Such a system, which is in conformity with the fiscal principle of territoriality, cannot be regarded 
as entailing any discrimination, overt or covert, prohibited by the Treaty. 
However, in dealing with the second condition (the keeping of accounts), the Court arguably took 
another approach. It first said (ground 24) that this obligation could constitute a restriction within the 
meaning of Article 52. It then explained that statement in the following terms: 
It means in practice that if such a company or firm wishes to carry forward any losses incurred by 
its branch, it must keep, in addition to its own accounts which must comply with the tax 
accounting rules applicable in the Member State in which it has its seat, separate accounts for its 
branch's activities complying with the tax accounting rules applicable in the State in which its 
branch is established. Furthermore, those separate accounts must be held, not at the company's 
seat, but at the place of establishment of its branch.  
Consequently, the imposition of such a condition, which specifically affects companies or firms 
having their seat in another Member State, is in principle prohibited by Article 52 of the Treaty. It 
could only be otherwise if the measure pursued a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty and 
were justified by pressing reasons of public interest. Even if that were so, it would still have to be 
of such a nature as to ensure achievement of the aim in question and not go beyond what was 
necessary for that purpose (grounds 24-25). 
The Court went on to recall (ground 31) that the effectiveness of fiscal supervision constitutes an 
overriding requirement of general interest capable of justifying a restriction on the exercise of a 
fundamental freedom, and to state that 
A Member State may therefore apply measures which enable the amount of both the income 
taxable in that State and of the losses which can be carried forward there to be ascertained clearly 
and precisely. 
However, it was excessive to require a non-resident company, which normally had no reason to 
keep separate accounts for (and at) its Luxembourg branch to have done so in a given year in order to 
be allowed to carry forward losses relating to that year. The Luxembourg authorities were therefore 
obliged to accept any clear and precise demonstration of the amount and relevance of the losses 
concerned, and were not entitled to insist on the “proper” accounts having been kept during the 
relevant period. 
The reasoning in grounds 24-25 can be seen as belonging to the “obstacle” approach
56, in so far as 
no mention is made of a difference in treatment as between resident and non-resident companies, and 
indeed we know from the recital of the Luxembourg provisions earlier in the judgment (ground 6) that 
the requirement to keep proper accounts applies equally to both categories of taxpayer. One could 
therefore understand the Court to be saying that this requirement, as applied to non-resident 
companies, is a “restriction” simply in the sense that it constitutes a burden for them. It is submitted, 
however, that this is not the correct reading of these passages of the judgment. It would indeed be 
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strange for the Court, having based its first finding on clear discrimination analysis, to then switch to 
“obstacle” reasoning in relation to the second issue before it. In reality, the words “in addition to its 
own accounts” in ground 25, and “which specifically affects companies or firms having their seat in 
another Member State” in ground 26, shows that the Court bases its reasoning on the fact that, in 
practice, the requirement to have kept accounts constitutes, for non-resident companies, a heavier 
burden than that borne by resident companies, which are obliged in any case to keep accounts 
according to Luxembourg rules. It is this effectively different treatment which leads the Court to 
examine the justification and proportionality of the measure. 
In Lankhorst-Hohorst, the contested measure was a German rule concerning the repayment by a 
resident company of loan capital received from shareholders. If the repayment was to a parent 
company “not entitled to corporation tax credit” (generally, a non-resident company), any interest paid 
on the loan was treated as a covert distribution of profits and taxed more heavily than interest on a 
similar repayment to a company entitled to the tax credit in question (generally, a resident company). 
These provisions were targeted at the practice known as "thin capitalisation", under which a group of 
companies may seek to reduce the taxation of profits made by one of its subsidiaries by electing to 
fund that subsidiary by way of loan capital, rather than equity capital, thereby allowing that subsidiary 
to transfer profits to a parent company in the form of interest which is deductible in the calculation of 
its taxable profits, and not in the form of non-deductible dividends. Where the parent company is 
resident in a State in which the rate of tax is lower than that which applies in the State in which the 
subsidiary is resident, the tax liability may thus be transferred to a State which has a lower tax rate. 
The reason for differentiating between payments made to resident and non-resident parents is 
obviously that such a strategy can only work in a transnational situation. 
Having referred to the obligation of the Member States to avoid any discrimination in the tax field 
on grounds of nationality (ground 26), the Court observed that, because resident parent companies 
generally receive the tax credit whereas, as a general rule, non-resident parent companies do not, the 
contested measure 
introduces a difference in treatment between resident subsidiary companies according to whether 
or not their parent company has its seat in Germany(ground 27). 
Then however, before going on to examine – and reject – the various grounds of justification put 
forward in defence of the measure, the Court said: 
Such a difference in treatment between resident subsidiary companies according to the seat of their 
parent company constitutes an obstacle to the freedom of establishment which is, in principle, 
prohibited by Article 43 EC. The tax measure in question in the main proceedings makes it less 
attractive for companies established in other Member States to exercise freedom of establishment 
and they may, in consequence, refrain from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in the 
State which adopts that measure (ground 32, emphasis added). 
What does this mean? The tax treatment would be just as unattractive if it applied to all parent 
companies, including those based in Germany. To know whether it was really unattractive, one would 
need information on the tax treatment of similar operations in other Member States, in particular that 
of establishment of the parent company, but no such information is to be found in the judgment. 
Surely the Court does not believe that the fact of being discriminated against (whatever the other 
available options may be) is a deterrent to the establishment by a company of a subsidiary in a given 
Member State. And why should the Court make such an odd statement in a judgment which otherwise 
makes perfect sense? One is led to suspect that the Court was trying to “cover both bases”, in the sense 
of carrying out a discrimination analysis but maintaining at the same time that the “obstacle” approach 
could also be applied. Or is this just a case in which the Court falls into the trap of its own rhetoric, 
applying well-worn formulas even in cases where they do not fit? 
If so, the Court fell into the same trap in Thin Cap Test Claimants, a UK case involving legislation 
similar to that at stake in Lankhorst-Hohorst. Although it referred repeatedly to the difference in The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax Measures 
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treatment according to the place of establishment of the parent, and although it is clear from the 
operative part of the judgment that such difference in treatment is a key element in the finding of a 
restriction
57, nevertheless at ground 61 of the judgment it essentially reproduced ground 32 of its 
judgment in Lankhorst-Hohorst, adding (at ground 62) that  
in order for such legislation to be considered to be a restriction on freedom of establishment, it is 
sufficient that it be capable of restricting the exercise of that freedom…  
The question remains unanswered as to how such legislation can be regarded as having such a 
capability in the absence of a more attractive option elsewhere. 
Rather different to the two cases just described is the case of Bosal Holding. This is a case of 
“outward” establishment, and there is therefore no preliminary reference to the rules on freedom of 
establishment forbidding discrimination based on nationality. In this case, a little effort is needed in 
order to understand that it is the difference in treatment between a person or company resident for tax 
purposes in the legislating Member State and that accorded to a non-resident which is at the root of the 
Court’s analysis. Bosal concerned a Dutch rule which allowed a resident parent company to deduct 
from its taxable income costs incurred in relation to a holding in the capital of a subsidiary only if 
those costs were “indirectly instrumental” in giving rise to profits taxable in the Netherlands. Bosal 
Holding asked for account to be taken of costs incurred in relation to its holdings in companies 
established in nine Member States other than the Netherlands. It was the refusal of the Dutch tax 
authorities to allow the deduction sought which was challenged before the national courts and which 
led to a reference to the Court of Justice. A particularity of the case was that the national rule at issue 
seemed to be authorised by Directive 90/435/EEC on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States
58. However, the Court declared 
that the directive had to be interpreted in the light of the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
establishment, and proceeded to say the following: 
As the referring court has pointed out, the limitation laid down in [the contested provision] of the 
deductibility of costs incurred by the parent company established in the Netherlands in connection 
with the capital of subsidiaries established in other Member States to cases where the latter 
generate, even if only indirectly, profits which are taxable in the Netherlands constitutes a 
hindrance to the establishment of subsidiaries in other Member States. In the light of that 
limitation, a parent company might be dissuaded from carrying on its activities through the 
intermediary of a subsidiary established in another Member State since, normally, such subsidiaries 
do not generate profits that are taxable in the Netherlands (ground 27, emphasis added). 
No specific mention here of the fact that resident subsidiaries typically do generate such profits, or 
of the interest of comparing the situations of resident and non-resident subsidiaries. However, the 
word “limitation” which introduces this passage presumably reflects the Court’s awareness that the 
former group did fall within the privileged category. And, logically, a parent company will only be 
dissuaded from establishing a subsidiary outside the Netherlands precisely because it can obtain more 
favourable treatment in relation to a nationally-based subsidiary. A further clue is to be found in the 
next ground of the judgment, which reads as follows: 
                                                      
57  It should be mentioned that, although the Court found a restriction, it also showed a great deal of openness towards such a 
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Moreover, such a limitation goes against the objective set forth by the directive, spelt out in the 
third recital of its preamble, according to which it is necessary to introduce a common system and 
eliminate the disadvantage due to the application of tax provisions governing relations between 
parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States which are less advantageous than 
those applicable to parent companies and subsidiaries of the same Member State (ground 28, 
emphasis added). 
In other words, the Court was perfectly aware – and attached importance to – the fact that the rule 
at issue differentiated in the way it treated relations between parent and subsidiary according to the 
place of establishment of the subsidiary. It is true that the use of the word “moreover” could allow one 
to think that this consideration was purely ancillary to another – “obstacle” – type of reasoning, but it 
would seem perverse to attribute such thinking to the Court in a case so obviously involving different 
treatment based on the place of establishment of the subsidiary. It has to be admitted, however, that the 
strict wording of the judgment is ambiguous, and can be seen as lending itself to an “obstacle” 
interpretation. 
Differentiation between Different Kinds of Transnational Transaction 
Finally, mention must be made of two cases involving a difference of treatment, not as between 
national transactions and those involving a transnational dimension, but between national and 
assimilated transnational scenarios and other transnational situations considered by the national 
legislator as deserving different treatment.  
In X AB and Y AB
59, the Court had to consider a Swedish rule which granted a tax advantage to 
intra-group transfers if it was made by a Swedish company to another Swedish company which was 
wholly owned either by the first company directly or by that company together with a wholly-owned 
Swedish subsidiary or subsidiaries. The same treatment was given if one or more of the wholly-owned 
subsidiaries was foreign provided they had their seats in the same Member State and that Sweden had 
concluded with that State a double-taxation agreement containing a non-discrimination clause. The 
advantage was refused – on the basis of the caselaw of the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court - 
where the wholly-owned subsidiaries had their seats in different Member States with which Sweden 
had likewise concluded double taxation agreements containing non-discrimination clauses. In relation 
to this rule, the Court said: 
such legislation entails a difference of treatment between various types of intra-group transfers on 
the basis of the criterion of the subsidiaries' seat. In the absence of justification, that difference of 
treatment is contrary to the provisions of the Treaty concerning freedom of establishment. It does 
not make any difference in this regard that the case-law of the [Swedish Supreme Administrative 
Court] allows type B transfers [those assimilated to purely national situations] to be given the 
same treatment accorded to type A transfers [purely national scenario] (ground 28). 
Since the Swedish government had made no attempt to justify the difference in treatment, the Court 
went on to declare arrangements such as the Swedish tax rules in question to be contrary to the Treaty 
provisions on freedom of establishment. 
Cadbury Schweppes
60 concerned a UK tax rule providing that (subject to certain exceptions), 
where a resident company had a controlling holding in a subsidiary established in a State where it was 
subject to a level of taxation lower than three quarters of that applying in the UK, the profits of the 
subsidiary were attributed to the parent company and taxed in its hands, subject to a credit given for 
the tax already paid by the subsidiary in its State of establishment. The Court observed that 
the legislation…. involves a difference in the treatment of resident companies on the basis of the 
level of taxation imposed on the company in which they have a controlling holding(ground 43). 
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It further noted that this rule did not lead to the paying of more tax than that which would have 
been payable on the same profits if they had been made by a subsidiary established in the UK. 
However, said the Court, 
under such legislation the resident company is taxed on profits of another legal person. That is not 
the case for a resident company with a subsidiary taxed in the United Kingdom or a subsidiary 
established outside that Member State which is not subject to a lower level of taxation (ground 45, 
emphasis added). 
It went on: 
the separate tax treatment…. and the resulting disadvantage for resident companies which have a 
subsidiary subject, in another Member State, to a lower level of taxation are such as to hinder the 
exercise of freedom of establishment by such companies, dissuading them from establishing, 
acquiring or maintaining a subsidiary in a Member State in which the latter is subject to such a 
level of taxation. They therefore constitute a restriction on freedom of establishment within the 
meaning of Articles 43 EC and 48 EC (ground 46, emphasis added). 
As for justification of the measure, the Court repeated previous rulings to the effect that the need to 
prevent reduction of tax revenue cannot be accepted as a matter of overriding general interest which 
could justify a restriction on a Treaty freedom. Nor could the fact that a resident company sets up a 
subsidiary in another Member State justify a general presumption of tax evasion. However, a national 
measure may be justified where it specifically relates to “wholly artificial arrangements” aimed at 
circumventing the application of the legislation of the Member State concerned. The Court was 
therefore prepared to accept legislation the purpose of which was  
to thwart practices which have no purpose other than to escape the tax normally due on the profits 
generated by activities carried on in national territory(ground 59), 
so long as it went no further than was necessary in order to achieve that purpose. That meant, in 
effect, that the legislation in question must apply only where the subsidiary carried out no genuine 
economic activity. It was not sufficient that the main motivation in establishing the subsidiary was to 
benefit from more favourable tax rates than those prevailing in the Member State of the parent company. 
For present purposes, the main point of interest in both cases is the fact that the Court treated as a 
restriction on freedom of establishment a measure which created a disadvantage only for establishment 
in certain Member States. It can be argued that these cases support the view that the Court favours the 
“obstacle” approach even in tax cases. Thus, no comparison is made between the legal treatment of 
national and transnational situations because such a comparison is irrelevant: all that matters is that 
there is an obstacle to certain cases of establishment in other Member States. These judgments can, 
however, be rationalized in a different way, by considering that the favourable tax treatment in each 
case was always available in the purely national situation, whereas it was only granted in certain cases 
of establishment in another Member State. Thus, in effect, the disadvantageous treatment was reserved 
to (certain kinds of) transnational operations. Seen in this way, these cases too can be brought within 
the mainstream of the Court’s caselaw on taxation. 
Freedom to Provide/Receive Services 
The Court’s caselaw applying this freedom to Member State tax measures has dealt with a vast array 
of taxes. Particularly noticeable in this area is the presence of a large proportion of cases concerning 
indirect taxes. Oddly enough, given the obvious analogy between indirect taxes on goods and those on 
services, it is in these cases that the most unexpected developments have taken place. Whereas, with 
very few exceptions, the judgments dealing with direct taxation are clearly based on an idea of 
discrimination, in the indirect tax cases the Court has varied its approach considerably, going so far in Karen Banks 
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one case as to declare discrimination to be irrelevant
61 and in another to deeming it indispensable to 
the application of the freedom in question
62. However, as will appear in what follows, all the cases can 
in fact be explained as to their result on the basis of discrimination analysis. 
Indirect Taxes 
The earliest judgments applying the Treaty rules on freedom to provide/receive services to national tax 
measures concern indirect taxes. Thus, in Corsica Ferries
63 and Case C-381/93 Commission v 
France
64, the taxes in question were tariffs imposed for port services. Strictly speaking, in both cases 
the Court had to interpret Regulation 4055/86 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to 
maritime transport.
65 However, as the Court said in Commission v France, this regulation in effect 
rendered applicable to the sphere of maritime transport between Member States the totality of the 
Treaty rules governing the freedom to provide services
66. In both cases, therefore, the Court’s analysis 
was based on the interpretation of those rules. 
In Corsica Ferries, the problem was that the Decree fixing the tariffs in question fixed lower tariffs 
than that generally applicable for various categories of vessel entitled to carry on maritime cabotage. 
At the time, only vessels flying the Italian flag could obtain permission to engage in maritime 
cabotage. The plaintiff in the main proceedings was a company established under Italian law but its 
vessels flew the Panamanian flag, so that it did not qualify for the lower tariffs. In deciding whether 
the resulting situation was compatible with Community law, the Court took considerable pains to 
bring the case within the scope of the rules on freedom to provide services. It first observed that 
the freedom to provide maritime transport services between Member States, and in particular the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, may be relied on by an undertaking as 
against the State in which it is established, if the services are provided for persons established in 
another Member State (ground 30, emphasis added). 
It then went on to observe that 
the [Italian] system gives preferential treatment to vessels permitted to engage in maritime 
cabotage, in other words, those flying the Italian flag.  
Such a system indirectly discriminates between economic operators according to their nationality, 
since vessels flying the national flag are generally operated by national economic operators, 
whereas transport undertakings from other Member States as a rule do not operate ships registered 
in the State applying that system.  
That finding is not affected by the fact that the class of less favourably treated economic operators 
may also include national transport undertakings which operate vessels not registered in their 
State, or by the fact that the class of operators given favourable treatment may include transport 
undertakings from other Member States which operate vessels registered in the aforesaid State, 
since the class receiving favourable treatment consists essentially of nationals of that State 
(grounds 32-34, emphasis added).  
An Italian company was therefore allowed to rely on the fact that the rule which placed it at a 
disadvantage was, generally speaking, a discriminatory rule. 
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In Commission v France, the judgment was equally centred on unequal treatment, although it 
includes an apparent reference to the obstacle approach. In that case, the Commission criticised France 
for applying a system of port charges which discriminated according to the destination or place of 
origin of passengers: the tax was lower for the transport of passengers whose destination was a French 
port than for those being transported to a port of another Member State, and tax was levied both on 
embarkation and disembarkation for passengers travelling between Member States whereas it was only 
charged on the embarkation of passengers travelling between French ports. Having determined that the 
principle of freedom to provide services applies to maritime transport services between Member 
States, the Court went on: 
Once the provision of services at issue in the present action is established as falling within Article 
59 of the Treaty, under the Court' s consistent case-law Article 59 precludes the application of any 
national legislation which without objective justification impedes a provider of services from 
actually exercising that freedom…  
In the perspective of a single market and in order to permit the realization of its objectives, that 
freedom likewise precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect of 
making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of 
services purely within one Member State.  
Consequently, the provision of maritime transport services between Member States cannot be 
subject to stricter conditions than those to which analogous provisions of services at domestic level 
are subject (grounds 16-18, emphasis added). 
In the quoted passages, the Court seems to indicate that there is a cumulative rule, first prohibiting 
any “impediments” to the free provision of services, and also (“likewise”) forbidding discrimination. 
This seems a little odd
67: if all impediments were prohibited, there would be no need for an additional 
ban on discriminations. Given the conclusion reached in the last paragraph quoted, it seems that the 
Court’s main focus was on discrimination. That appears to be confirmed by a later passage in the 
judgment in which the Court sums up its position by emphasising the anti-protectionist aim of the rule 
on freedom to provide services: 
Where national legislation, though applicable without discrimination to all vessels whether used 
by national providers of services or by those from other Member States, operates a distinction 
according to whether those vessels are engaged in internal transport or in intra-Community 
transport, thus securing a special advantage for the domestic market and the internal transport 
services of the Member State in question, that legislation must be deemed to constitute a restriction 
on the freedom to provide maritime transport services (ground 21, emphasis added). 
A tariff imposed on maritime transport services was also the subject of the judgment in Sea-Land 
Service
68. In that case, the charge was presented by the Dutch legislation which imposed it as payment 
for vessel traffic services rendered by the State in certain ports and waterways. However, it was 
payable only by sea-going vessels longer than 41 metres, to the exclusion therefore of inland waterway 
vessels, although the services in question were also used (to a somewhat lesser extent) by the latter. 
Asked to pronounce on the compatibility of such a system with Community law, the Court first of all 
rejected the contention (which was supported by the Commission) that, since inland waterway vessels 
using the services in question were almost exclusively vessels flying the Netherlands flag, and 
therefore predominantly operated by Dutch enterprises, their exemption from the obligation to pay the 
tariff amounted to indirect discrimination based on nationality. In this regard, the Court said: 
While it is true that Article 59 and the third paragraph of Article 60 of the EC Treaty (now the 
third paragraph of Article 50 EC) prohibit all forms of disguised discrimination which, although 
based on criteria which appear to be neutral, in practice lead to the same result…. , it is also true 
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that a difference of treatment cannot constitute discrimination unless the circumstances in question 
are comparable …  
As is apparent from the orders for reference, there are in this case objective differences between 
sea-going vessels longer than 41 metres and inland waterway vessels, in particular as concerns 
their respective markets - differences which reveal, moreover, that those two categories of means 
of transport are not comparable” (grounds 36-37).  
In other words, because sea-going and inland waterway vessels were only to a limited extent in 
competition with each other, any cost difference imposed on them would not affect their respective 
market positions, and could not be considered discriminatory. However, the Court then went on: 
None the less, the VTS system at issue in the main proceedings, in that it requires the payment of a 
tariff by sea-going vessels longer than 41 metres, is liable to impede or render less attractive the 
provision of those services and therefore constitutes a restriction on their free circulation (ground 
38). 
On this basis, every tax is a restriction on free circulation, and can only survive scrutiny under 
Community law if it is, in the eyes of the Court of Justice, a justified tax. Such was the case here. The 
Court noted that the tariff in question was applied to all operators in an equivalent position. It further 
considered that vessel traffic services constituted a nautical service essential to public security, and that: 
the VTS tariff to which sea-going vessels longer than 41 metres are subject, as users of that 
service, contributes to the general interest in public security in those waters (ground 42). 
Lastly, as regards proportionality the Court was satisfied that there was “a correlation” between the 
cost of the service provided and the amount of the tariff (ground 43). 
Here then we see the Court, having excluded all arguments of protectionism, nevertheless 
examining the justification of a national tax measure on the basis of its own views about the 
requirements of national security and the right way to finance them. Had it considered that vessel 
traffic services were not important enough to warrant a restriction on the free provision of maritime 
transport services, or that the tariff imposed on certain users was not the most effective way of raising 
the necessary revenue, it would have been obliged to declare such taxes incompatible with the Treaty rules. 
In other areas the Court has been more circumspect, even if its language has sometimes included 
broad references to the “obstacle” approach. In De Coster
69, the tax which led to a preliminary 
reference was a tax on satellite dishes introduced by the Belgian municipal authority of Watermael-
Boitsfort. Having identified the tax as a possible restriction on the provision of television services, the 
Court then went on in the following terms: 
It must also be noted that, according to the case-law of the Court, Article 59 of the Treaty requires 
not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of 
services who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction, 
even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member 
States, which is liable to prohibit or further impede the activities of a provider of services 
established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services….  
Furthermore, the Court has already held that Article 59 of the Treaty precludes the application of 
any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of services between Member 
States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State (grounds 29-
30, emphasis added).  
Here we have the same logical oddity as that already noted in relation to Commission v France, 
with the added dimension of the reference to “further impeding”, which seems to indicate that the 
Court considers that national legislation which imposes on a provider of services any obligation going 
beyond those to which he is subject in his Member State of establishment is ipso facto a restriction 
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which is, in principle, prohibited by the rules on free movement. However, in the rest of its reasoning 
in this case, the Court makes no further reference to such an idea and, on the contrary, bases itself 
entirely on discrimination analysis. It thus notes that the tax on satellite dishes  
has the effect of a charge on the reception of television programmes transmitted by satellite which 
does not apply to the reception of programmes transmitted by cable, since the recipient does not 
have to pay a similar tax on that method of reception (ground 31), 
and that while unlimited access to cable distribution is available to broadcasters established in 
Belgium, this is not the case for broadcasters established in many other Member States, the 
programmes of which can be received only by satellite (ground 32). The Court sums up the effect of 
the tax measure in question as follows: 
the tax on satellite dishes introduced by the tax regulation is liable to impede more the activities of 
operators in the field of broadcasting or television transmission established in Member States other 
than the Kingdom of Belgium, while giving an advantage to the internal Belgian market and to 
radio and television distribution within that Member State (ground 35, emphasis added). 
On this basis, the Court goes on to examine – and reject – the environmental justification for the 
measure put forward by the municipality of Watermael-Boitsfort. It considered that, even if the aim of 
preventing the uncontrolled proliferation of satellite dishes could justify a restriction of freedom to 
provide services, in any event the measure adopted went further than was necessary in order to achieve 
protection of the environment. Other methods were available which would be less restrictive of the 
free movement of television services, such as rules concerning the size of dishes, their positioning or 
the use of communal dishes. 
In Stylianakis
70, the contested measure was a Greek airport tax which imposed on flights of more 
than 750 kilometres a charge double that imposed on shorter flights. Having observed that the 
principle of freedom to provide services had been applied to the air transport sector by Regulation 
2408/92
71, the Court went on as follows: 
That freedom precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect of making 
the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services 
purely within one Member State, irrespective of whether there is discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality or residence…  
As regards the tax at issue in the main proceedings, those air journeys which cover a distance of 
more than 750 km from a Greek airport, on which the most onerous tax is imposed, are all 
journeys between Member States or to third countries, whereas those covering a distance of less 
than 750 km, which are subject to the lower tax, are, with one exception, all domestic flights 
within Greece. It must therefore be held that, despite the ostensible neutrality of the criterion used 
to differentiate the amount of tax imposed, the most onerous tax specifically concerns non-
domestic flights (grounds 25-26, emphasis added). 
The Court goes on to observe that there appears to be no cost element in the tax which could 
explain the difference in level according to the length of the flight concerned. Curiously enough, in the 
light of its judgment in Sea-Land, it does not enquire at all whether there is any substantial level of 
competition between international flights and flights within Greece, but seems to take it for granted 
that the two categories are comparable. In this regard, it says 
since airport taxes directly and automatically influence the price of the journey, differences in the 
taxes to be paid by passengers will automatically be reflected in the transport cost, and thus, in the 
case in the main proceedings, access to domestic flights will be favoured over access to intra-
Community flights (ground 28). 
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Whatever the accuracy of this may be from an economic standpoint, it is clear that the Court’s 
conclusion - that a tax such as the airport tax in question is precluded by Community law - is 
motivated by a protectionist view of such measures. 
Two further cases on indirect taxes show the Court moving towards a clear consciousness of the 
need to adopt a discrimination-based approach. In Viacom
72, the Court was asked to pronounce on the 
compatibility with the rules on freedom to provide/receive services of a local tax on the posting of 
bills. The background to the case was a dispute between a French property company and an Italian 
provider of advertising services which had been asked to place advertisements within the territory of 
the municipality of Genoa on behalf of the French company. The latter then refused to pay that part of 
the bill of the advertising company which reflected the tax it had been obliged to pay the municipality 
in order to be allowed to put up advertising posters in public places.  
In her Opinion, Advocate General Kokott pointed out to the Court that it had to choose between 
obstacle and discrimination analysis (though she called them “the justification solution” and “the 
definition-based solution”). She pointed out that, under the first approach, because all taxes may make 
an economic activity more expensive and therefore less attractive, they may be seen as restrictions of 
fundamental freedoms. It would then be necessary to examine their justification. However, since the 
raising of revenue is an essential requirement for State action, taxes would have to be regarded as 
justified in principle, which would leave the Court little scope for its enquiry. In favour of the second 
approach, the Advocate General argued that the notion of “restriction”, indicating a measure presumed 
contrary to Community law unless justified, was quite unsuitable to tax measures, which should be 
regarded as legitimate in principle, falling within the category of forbidden measures only if 
discriminatory. The Advocate General seems to have seen a residual rôle for “the justification 
solution” in cases where a tax was so high as to amount to a prohibition on carrying on a given activity 
(paragraph 63 of her Opinion). 
The Court seems to have taken the Advocate General’s advice to heart, but to have hesitated to 
make a radical choice in its analysis of the case. In its judgment, after reciting the usual formula about 
the rules on freedom to provide services requiring the elimination of any “restriction” which is “liable 
to prohibit or otherwise impede” the activities of a provider of services, the Court went on as follows: 
With regard to the question of whether the levying by municipal authorities of a tax such as the 
advertising tax constitutes an impediment incompatible with Article 49 EC, it must first of all be 
noted that such a tax is applicable without distinction to any provision of services entailing 
outdoor advertising and public bill-posting in the territory of the municipality concerned. The rules 
on the levying of this tax do not, therefore, draw any distinction based on the place of 
establishment of the provider or recipient of the bill-posting services or on the place of origin of 
the goods or services that form the subject-matter of the advertising messages disseminated. 
Next, such a tax is applied only to outdoor advertising activities involving the use of public space 
administered by the municipal authorities and its amount is fixed at a level which may be 
considered modest in relation to the value of the services provided which are subject to it. In those 
circumstances, the levying of such a tax is not on any view liable to prohibit, impede or otherwise 
make less attractive the provision of advertising services to be carried out in the territory of the 
municipalities concerned, including the case in which the provision of services is of a cross-border 
nature on account of the place of establishment of either the provider or the recipient of the 
services(grounds 37-38, emphasis added). 
The Court therefore interprets the rules on free movement as not prohibiting the type of tax under 
consideration both because it contains no discrimination and because it seems like an unobjectionable 
measure which, in view of the modest amount involved, is unlikely in practice to act as a barrier to 
trade. The words “including the case” in ground 38 show that the Court is still engaged in an 
assessment of the reasonableness of the tax as a whole, and not only of its particular effects on 
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exchange of services between Member States. In other words, the Court has given unusual prominence 
to the idea of discrimination, but has not yet bitten the bullet of adopting discrimination analysis as its 
only guide. 
This changes entirely in Mobistar
73. This case raised the issue of the compatibility with the Treaty 
rules on freedom to provide services of two taxes raised by Belgian local authorities, one on 
transmission pylons, masts and antennae for GSM, and the other on external antennae. The measures 
were contested by mobile telephony operators established in Belgium, and the Belgian Conseil d’Etat 
asked for the Court’s help in interpreting the applicable provisions of Community law. As regards 
freedom to provide services, the Court first recalled its usual positions according to which all 
restrictions are prohibited, and also (“furthermore”) any measure making the provision of services 
between Member States more difficult than equivalent transactions on a national level (grounds 29-
30). The Court then went on: 
By contrast, measures, the only effect of which is to create additional costs in respect of the 
service in question and which affect in the same way the provision of services between Member 
States and that within one Member State, do not fall within the scope of Article 59 of the Treaty.  
As regards the question whether the levy by municipal authorities of taxes such as those in 
question in the main proceedings amounts to a restriction incompatible with Article 59, it is 
necessary to point out that such taxes apply without distinction to all owners of mobile telephone 
installations within the commune in question, and that foreign operators are not, either in fact or in 
law, more adversely affected by those measures than national operators.  
Nor do the tax measures in question make cross-border service provision more difficult than 
national service provision. Admittedly, introducing a tax on pylons, masts and antennae can make 
tariffs for mobile telephone communications to Belgium from abroad and vice versa more 
expensive. However, national telephone service provision is, to the same extent, subject to the risk 
that the tax will have an impact on tariffs.  
It is appropriate to add that there is nothing in the file to suggest that the cumulative effect of the 
local taxes compromises freedom to provide mobile telephony services between other Member 
States and the Kingdom of Belgium (grounds 31-34, emphasis added).  
In the first ground quoted, the Court clearly states that a tax on services is only caught by the rules 
on freedom to provide services (needing therefore to be justified in order to be allowed) if it creates 
extra difficulties for cross-border trade than for internal transactions. The final consideration 
(introduced by the words “It is appropriate to add”) is ambiguous: has the idea that an over-large tax 
might have to be examined as to its justification even if non-discriminatory been abandoned or not? 
The quoted sentence can be read either as a comforting rider without legal significance or as a signal 
that, in an exceptional case, the Court could revert to the “restriction” approach. However, it seems 
safe to say that this judgment indicates that discrimination has finally been adopted by the Court as the 
guiding criterion of the legality of indirect tax meaures adopted by the Member States. 
Direct Taxes 
The situation is less clear as regards direct taxes; although most of the Court’s judgments applying the 
rules on freedom to provide services in this area are either based on, or include, discrimination 
considerations, there is at least one (rather recent) judgment which explicitly applies obstacle 
analysis
74. 
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The first case in which the Court applied the principle of freedom to provide/receive services in the 
context of a direct tax rule was that of Jessica Safir
75. This case arose out of Swedish rules governing 
the taxation of savings in the form of capital life assurance. These rules differed considerably 
according to whether the insurance was taken out with a company established in Sweden or in another 
country. The Court began its analysis with the same “impediment and likewise discrimination” 
discourse which we have already seen in relation to Commission v France. The Court then declared 
(ground 25) that it had to determine 
whether such legislation creates obstacles to the freedom to provide services and whether, should 
this be the case, such obstacles are justified on the grounds relied on by the Swedish Government. 
Throughout the rest of the judgment, however, what the Court does is to compare the two relevant 
sets of tax rules and to point out the various ways in which the rules applicable to the relationship with 
a foreign life assurance company were less favourable than those applying to a purely internal 
situation, or at least were likely to create uncertainty as to the amount of tax payable, with obvious 
effects in terms of dissuading individuals from taking out capital life assurance with companies not 
established in Sweden and the latter from offering their services on the Swedish market (see especially 
ground 30). On this basis, the Court examines the reasons put forward by the Swedish government to 
explain its tax provisions, and concludes that its objectives could be achieved by alternative 
arrangements less restrictive of freedom to provide services. In spite of the ambiguities in the language 
of the judgment, therefore, the schema followed corresponds to discrimination analysis. 
Even clearer are most of the judgments which follow. Eurowings
76concerned German tax rules 
which gave less favourable treatment to the leasing of aircraft from an undertaking established outside 
Germany than to an equivalent transaction with a German-based company. Having recalled the 
obligation of the Member States to exercise their tax competence consistently with Community law 
(ground 32), the Court went on to present the rules on freedom to provide services as follows: 
since leasing is a service within the meaning of Article 60 of the EC Treaty (now Article 50 EC), it 
should be noted that the Court has held that Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the abolition 
of any discrimination on account of nationality against a person providing services but also the 
abolition of any restriction on the freedom to provide services imposed on the ground that the 
person providing service is established in a Member State other than the one in which the service 
is provided (ground 33, emphasis added)
77. 
The Court then noted the differences in the tax rules under examination (ground 36) and their 
dissuasive effect on German undertakings leasing goods from lessors established in other Member 
States (ground 37). It summed up the position as follows: 
any legislation of a Member State which, like that at issue in the main action, reserves a fiscal 
advantage to the majority of undertakings which lease goods from lessors established in that State 
whilst depriving those leasing from lessors established in another Member State of such an 
advantage gives rise to a difference of treatment based on the place of establishment of the 
provider of services, which is prohibited by Article 59 of the Treaty (ground 40, emphasis added). 
The Court then examined – and rejected – the alleged justification of the measure. 
In Danner
78, the rule at issue was a Finnish measure which substantially disallowed deductions 
from taxable income of contributions to voluntary pension schemes operated by institutions 
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established outside Finland while allowing such deductions where the contributions were made to 
Finnish-based pension providers. The Court’s introductory statement as to the meaning of the Treaty 
rules on freedom to provide services was the following: 
In the perspective of a single market and in order to permit the attainment of the objectives thereof, 
Article 59 of the Treaty precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect 
of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of 
services purely within one Member State” (ground 29, emphasis added). 
As in Stylianakis, it thus reproduced the “discrimination” part of the formula in Commission v 
France without the preliminary “restriction” part
79. 
The Court then observed that 
in view of the important role played, at the time when a pension insurance contract is taken out, by 
the possibility of obtaining tax relief under that head, such legislation is liable to dissuade 
individuals from taking out voluntary pension insurance with institutions established in a Member 
State other than Finland and to dissuade those institutions from offering their services on the 
Finnish market (ground 31). 
The Court thus concluded that the Finnish rules in question constituted a restriction on freedom to 
provide/receive insurance services, and went on to examine (and reject) the arguments in their defence 
which had been put forward by the Finnish government (and by the Danish government, intervening). 
It is interesting to note that the Court refused to accept a Bachmann-style defence on the basis (inter 
alia) that, under the Finnish tax system, pensions payable by foreign institutions to Finnish residents 
are taxed, irrespective of whether the insurance contributions paid to build up such pensions were or 
were not deducted from the taxable income of their recipients (ground 38). The fiscal coherence 
argument therefore did not operate. 
In Gerritse
80, the Court deployed discrimination analysis in order to declare unlawful a national rule 
which allowed only residents (fully taxable) to deduct business expenses from their taxable income. 
Mr Gerritse was a Dutch national and resident who earned some of his income in other Member States 
through his performances as a drummer. He challenged the refusal of the German tax authorities to 
allow him to deduct from that part of his income taxable in Germany the business expenses incurred in 
connection with earning that income. Asked about the applicability of the Community rules on 
freedom to provide services, the Court noted that 
the business expenses in question are directly linked to the activity that generated the taxable 
income in Germany, so that residents and non-residents are placed in a comparable situation in that 
respect(ground 27).  
The Court went on: 
In those circumstances, a national provision which, in matters of taxation, refuses to allow non-
residents to deduct business expenses, whereas residents are allowed to do so, risks operating 
mainly to the detriment of nationals of other Member States and therefore constitutes indirect 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, contrary in principle to Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty 
(ground 28, emphasis added).  
Since no clear argument had been put forward to justify the tax rule at issue, the Court declared 
such a measure contrary to the rules on free movement of services. However, on the basis that the 
situations of resident and non-resident taxpayers are not comparable in many respects, the Court 
decided that it was legitimate for a Member State to reserve the benefit of tax-free allowances having a 
social purpose to resident taxpayers, and that the fact that different methods were used to calculate and 
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recover the tax due was not unlawful so long as a non-resident was not, in effect, taxed more heavily 
than a resident. 
Laboratoires Fournier
81concerned a French rule under which a tax credit for research was available 
to resident companies only if the research was carried out in France. The Court described the situation 
as follows: 
the legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by restricting the 
benefit of a tax credit for research only to research carried out in that Member State, makes the 
provision of services constituted by the research activity subject to different tax arrangements 
depending on whether it is carried out in other Member States or in the Member State 
concerned….  
Such legislation differentiates according to the place where the services are provided, contrary to 
Article 49 EC (grounds 15-16, emphasis added). 
None of the arguments put forward by the French government to justify this difference in treatment 
being found acceptable, the Court declared such discrimination contrary to the rules on freedom to 
provide services. 
In the cases examined so far, the criteria used by the Court to determine the existence of a 
restriction range from indirect discrimination based on the nationality or the place of establishment of 
the service provider to the notion of making the provision of services between Member States more 
difficult than an equivalent operation in a purely national context. All these criteria fit perfectly within 
discrimination analysis. There seems to be only one judgment in which the Court has applied a 
frontally “obstacle” approach, and one other in which the reasoning is ambiguous. 
The first judgment is that handed down in Case C-433/04, Commission v Belgium
 82. In that case, 
the Commission criticised a Belgian tax measure aiming to deal with tax fraud in the construction 
sector. For various activities in this sector, it was required to use registered contractors. Principals and 
contractors which had recourse to unregistered contractors or subcontractors were obliged to withold 
15% of payments, which had to be handed over to the Belgian tax authorities. The principal or 
contractor was also made jointly and severally liable for the tax debts of the unregistered contractor or 
subcontractor, up to a certain amount. Obviously many legitimate service providers established outside 
Belgium would not be registered in Belgium, and it was the effect on them of this measure which led 
the Commission to start infringement proceedings. Given the limited liability to Belgian tax of 
foreign-based service providers in the building sector, the Commission regarded the measure as 
unjustified and disproportionate. It did not attempt however to present the case in terms of indirect 
discrimination, and the Court followed suit. 
The Court began its analysis of the Belgian measure by recalling that 
the Court has consistently held that Article 49 EC requires not only the elimination of all 
discrimination on grounds of nationality against service providers who are established in another 
Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction on the freedom to provide services, even if 
it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, 
which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of service providers 
from other Member States who lawfully provide similar services in their Member State of origin 
(ground 28, emphasis added).  
The Court went on: 
measures which are capable of deterring an operator from exercising his freedom to provide 
services are covered by the prohibition thus laid down in the EC Treaty(ground 29).  
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Given the disadvantage for unregistered service providers of not being able to dispose immediately 
of part of their income (which they could only recover at the end of an adminstrative procedure), those 
of them which were not established in Belgium were likely to be deterred from accessing the Belgian 
market (ground 30). Moreover, the joint liability for tax debts of the unregistered service provider 
which was imposed on the principal or contractor was liable to dissuade the latter from having 
recourse to the services of providers established in other Member States (ground 31). In this regard, 
the Court added: 
Even if joint liability applies without distinction when an unregistered service provider is used, 
regardless of whether he is established in Belgium or in another Member State, it must 
nevertheless be stated that, while it does not deprive service providers who are not registered and 
not established in Belgium of the ability to supply their services there, the disputed provision does 
make access to the Belgian market difficult for them (ground 31, emphasis added). 
On the basis then that the measure created difficulties of access to the Belgian market for service 
providers established in other Member States, and without a word of comparison regarding the 
position of nationally-based service providers, the Court concluded that the witholding obligation and 
joint liability constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide services (ground 32). It went on to 
examine the arguments of the Belgian government concerning the justification of the measures, but 
found that they were disproportionate in view of the limited cases in which foreign-based service 
providers in the building sector were liable to pay Belgian taxes. Belgium was therefore declared to be 
in breach of its obligations under the Treaty. 
It is noteworthy that this judgment was handed down more than a year after the judgment in 
Mobistar. Can it possibly be that the Court has decided that discrimination is the key to illegality as 
regards indirect, but not direct, taxes
83? This seems unlikely. Possibly the Court, faced with a choice 
between accepting or rejecting the case as presented by the Commission (in a direct action), preferred 
to accept it precisely because it could have been based on discrimination analysis. It could thus have 
been pointed out that the measures in question created difficulties only for Belgian-based operators of 
doubtful legitimacy, whereas they affected all building contractors established in other Member States 
and wishing to provide services in Belgium. Alternatively, the Commission's case could have put on 
the ground that the obligation to register (and the somewhat draconian measures to enforce this 
obligation) was, as a practical matter, a heavier burden for builders established in other Member 
States, for which Belgium represented only a fraction of their potential market, or that it was 
discriminatory to apply the same measure to situations which were not comparable, ie to those 
normally liable for Belgian taxes, and to those only exceptionally so. None of these approaches having 
been adopted by the Commission, the Court may have had to choose between accepting the case as 
presented or rejecting it on the ground that no differential impact had been demonstrated in the impact 
of the measure on national and transnational transactions. However that may be, the outcome is a 
judgment which casts doubt on the direction of the Court’s caselaw. 
Finally, there is the judgment handed down on 30 January 2007 in Case C-150/04, Commission v 
Denmark. This case concerned the deductibility from taxable income, or exemption from taxation, of 
contributions to pension schemes. The Danish measures criticised by the Commission limited such 
favourable treatment to payments made to pension institutions established in Denmark. In considering 
whether the Danish rules constituted a restriction on freedom to provide services, the Court first made 
the statement we have already seen in Commission v France and Mobistar about the provisions on free 
movement of services forbidding national measures which were impediments to service providers and 
“also” national rules which make the provision of services between Member States more difficult than 
the same operation on a national level (grounds 37-38). Having noted that the tax advantages at issue 
were available only to pension institutions having an establishment in Denmark, the Court then went on: 
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With regard to Article 49 EC, two categories of situation in which such a requirement is liable to 
have a dissuasive effect must be distinguished. In the first, service providers are dissuaded from 
establishing themselves in Denmark because of the costs involved. Such a situation constitutes, of 
itself, a denial of that freedom… In the second, the recipients of those services are dissuaded from 
becoming members of a pension scheme with a pension institution established in another Member 
State, in view of the important role played, at the time when a pension insurance contract is taken 
out, by the possibility of obtaining tax relief under that head (ground 40). 
The first part of this is not easy to understand. The fact that service providers might be dissuaded 
from establishing themselves in Denmark is irrelevant to a restriction on freedom to provide services, 
which presumes no establishment. Anyway, the rule could not possibly operate to dissuade 
establishment since the latter precisely confers the advantage. The Court must have meant that service 
providers established in other Member States would be dissuaded from providing services in 
Denmark. As for “the costs involved”, this is perhaps a shorthand reference to the competitive 
disadvantage at which service providers found themselves under the Danish measures. 
In any event, this is all the Court says about freedom to provide services before concluding (at 
ground 45) that the contested legislation constitutes an “obstacle” to that freedom. In trying to 
determine what kind of analysis has led to the conclusion, one has to admit that there is no explicit 
reference in the legal reasoning to a comparison between the treatment of pension institutions 
established in Denmark and those established in other Member States. On the other hand, the 
difference in treatment emerges so clearly from the description of the facts of the case, and those facts 
are so similar to those at issue in Danner, that it is difficult to believe that the Court could have 
intended to adopt an approach different to that set out in its judgment in the latter case. Moreover, the 
second “dissuasive effect” referred to by the Court (in terms closely echoing the judgment in Danner) 
is posited precisely on the fact that the tax advantage is available only to pension institutions 
established in Denmark. On balance, therefore, and in spite of the ambiguities of the judgment, the 
better view seems to be that the thinking underlying the conclusion as to the existence of a restriction 
on freedom to provide services is based on the unequal treatment of equivalent economic transactions 
depending on the place of establishment of the service provider. 
As a footnote on this case, it is interesting to observe that, in examining and rejecting the 
arguments of the Danish government attempting to justify the difference in treatment, the Court finally 
abandons its Bachmann doctrine on the cohesion of the tax system. It points out that the element 
which could threaten the cohesion of the Danish tax system is not the fact that a pension is taken out 
with a pension institution established in another Member State, but the possibility that the scheme 
member leaves Denmark to live in another Member State between the time of making his 
contributions and the time of receiving his pension. It is in those circumstances that Denmark is likely 
to lose its power to tax the pension, wherever the pension institution may be. Where, on the other 
hand, the pensioner continues to live in Denmark, the latter will be competent to tax his pension, again 
irrespective of the country of establishment of the pension scheme. There is therefore an insufficient 
connection between the place of establishment of the pension institution and the perceived danger to 
the cohesion of a Member State’s tax system to justify the unequal treatment which has been practised 
by several Member States. 
Free Movement of Capital 
The great majority of judgments in the cases concerning this freedom include an examination of 
whether cross-border transactions suffer from a disadvantage in comparison with purely national 
investments. Only one judgment seems to depart from this pattern, with a couple of others showing 
signs of uncertainty as to which path of reasoning they are following. The main problem in the cases 
dealt with under this freedom is a certain ambiguity as to whether discrimination is the criterion for 
identifying a restriction in the first place, or whether it comes into play only at a second stage, after a 
restriction has already been identified, in the context of the examination of the justification of the The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax Measures 
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measure in question. As in the case of the other freedoms, all the judgments in this area seem to be 
explicable, as to their outcome, by way of discrimination analysis. 
Restriction without Discrimination 
The one case in which the Court appears unambiguously to have indicated that a restriction on the free 
movement of capital can exist without any difference of treatment between national and transnational 
situations is also the first case in which the Court had to apply the Treaty provisions on free movement 
of capital in the context of a Member State tax measure. Sandoz
84 concerned two provisions of 
Austrian law. The first simply decreed that all loan agreements (including those entered into with a 
lender established outside Austria) were subject to stamp duty of 0.8% of the value of the loan. The 
second treated a loan contracted with a lender not established in Austria in such a way that this loan 
would be subject to the tax even in circumstances in which a loan by an Austrian lender would not. 
The Court was asked to pronounce on the compatibility with Community law of both types of 
provision, as they applied to a loan contracted with a lender in another Member State. 
As regards the first provision, the Court determined that its application to a loan contracted in 
another Member State was a restriction on the free movement of capital because it 
deprives residents of a Member State of the possibility of benefiting from the absence of taxation 
which may be associated with loans obtained outside the national territory (ground 19).  
Accordingly, said the Court, 
such a measure is likely to deter such residents from obtaining loans from persons established in 
other Member States (also ground 19). 
The Court went on, however, to decide that this type of measure was justified as a “requisite 
measure to prevent infringements of national law and regulations” within the meaning of Article 
73d(1)(b) of the treaty (now Article 58(1)(b)). It arrived at this result by considering that the aim of the 
measure was to ensure equality of taxation for all Austrian residents who entered into a loan 
agreement, and that  
[s]ince the effect of such a measure is to compel such persons to pay the duty, it prevents taxable 
persons from evading the requirements of domestic tax legislation through the exercise of freedom 
of movement of capital guaranteed by Article 73b(1) of the Treaty (ground 24). 
The Court went on to note that the measure entailed no “arbitrary discrimination” since the tax 
applied to all borrowers resident in Austria without distinction as to nationality or the place where the 
loan was contracted. 
Here then we have the oddity of the Court first drawing into the net of potential illegality a 
perfectly neutral tax measure, only to let it out again essentially because it was neutral, and moreover 
with the strange argument that the simple imposition of a duty had the effect of compelling people to 
pay it, thus transforming it into a measure designed to prevent infringements of national tax law. This 
somewhat tortured approach is evidence of the fact that the drafters of the Treaty provisions on free 
movement of capital never envisaged entirely neutral tax measures being treated as restrictions, and 
therefore provided no suitable “let-out” clause for them. 
Even more remarkable, in the light of the foregoing, is the Court’s approach to the second 
(discriminatory) provision of Austrian law. The Court described the difference in treatment of the 
national and transnational situation. It continued: 
It follows that that provision discriminates according to the place where the loan is contracted. 
Discrimination of that nature is likely to deter residents from contracting loans with persons 
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established in other Member States and therefore constitutes a restriction on the movement of 
capital within the meaning of Article 73b(1) of the Treaty”(ground 31, emphasis added). 
The Court went on to reject the justifications for the measure advanced by the Austrian 
Government, and to declare the provision contrary to the Treaty rules on free movement of capital. 
Thus, discrimination was irrelevant to the Court’s first finding of a restriction, but key to the 
second. It can perhaps be argued that, for the Court, discrimination was a sufficient, but not a 
necessary, condition for the existence of a restriction. In any event, the two approaches present in the 
Sandoz judgment continue to appear in the Court’s caselaw. 
Discrimination as Criterion of Restriction 
As with the cases examined under the other freedoms, even where differences in treatment clearly play 
a major rôle in the Court’s analysis, there are certain differences between the judgments as to how 
bluntly discrimination is presented as key to the Court’s reasoning. Thus, in Verkooijen
85, where the 
Court had to consider a Dutch rule restricting an income tax exemption on dividends to cases in which 
the dividends were paid by a company established in the Netherlands, it did not use unambiguous 
“discrimination” terminology throughout the judgment. At ground 34, it started off by saying that 
A legislative provision such as the one at issue in the main proceedings has the effect of 
dissuading nationals of a Member State residing in the Netherlands from investing their capital in 
companies which have their seat in another Member State.”  
This could be taken for “obstacle” language if it were not obvious that the only reason Netherlands 
residents would be dissuaded from investing in other Member States was that they could obtain better 
tax treatment by investing at home. Then the Court went on: 
It is also clear from the legislative history of that provision that the exemption of dividends, 
accompanied by the limitation of that exemption to dividends on shares in companies which have 
their seat in the Netherlands, was intended specifically to promote investments by individuals in 
companies so established in the Netherlands in order to increase their equity capital. 
This sounds like a fairly clear indication that the Court is concerned with protectionism, but it 
would of course be clearer if a specific reference were made to it, or if the Court had mentioned the 
comparative situation of companies established in other Member States. However, the matter does 
become clearer in the next ground of the judgment. Here the Court says: 
Such a provision also has a restrictive effect as regards companies established in other Member 
States: it constitutes an obstacle to the raising of capital in the Netherlands since the dividends 
which such companies pay to Netherlands residents receive less favourable tax treatment than 
dividends distributed by a company established in the Netherlands, so that their shares are less 
attractive to investors residing in the Netherlands than shares in companies which have their seat 
in that Member State (ground 35, emphasis added). 
The Court therefore concludes that 
It follows that to make the grant of a tax advantage, such as the dividend exemption, relating to 
taxation of the income of natural persons who are shareholders subject to the condition that the 
dividends are paid by companies established within national territory constitutes a restriction on 
capital movements (ground 36, emphasis added). 
The Court was more straightforward in Manninen
86, which is a Finnish version of Verkooijen 
except that in this case the effective exemption from tax in the hands of the shareholder was designed 
to prevent double taxation of company profits distributed to shareholders by setting off the corporation 
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tax due from the company distributing dividends against the tax due from the shareholder by way of 
income tax on revenue from capital. The end result was that dividends were no longer taxed in the 
hands of the shareholder, so long as the dividends in question were paid by a company established in 
Finland. In Manninen, the Court focused immediately in the difference in treatment as between 
dividends received from a Finnish and a non-Finnish company. At grounds 20-22 of its judgment it said: 
Since the tax credit applies solely in favour of dividends paid by companies established in Finland, 
that legislation disadvantages fully taxable persons in Finland who receive dividends from 
companies established in other Member States… 
It follows that the Finnish tax legislation has the effect of deterring fully taxable persons in Finland 
from investing their capital in companies established in another Member State.  
Meilicke
87 concerned a German version of the Finnish tax credit system discussed in Manninen. In 
determining whether that system constituted a restriction on the free movement of capital within the 
meaning of Article 56, the Court said: 
Since the tax credit applies solely in respect of dividends paid by companies established in 
Germany, that legislation disadvantages persons who are fully taxable in that Member State for 
income tax purposes and receive dividends from companies established in other Member States. 
Such persons, for their part, are taxed without being entitled to set off the corporation tax payable 
by those companies in their State of establishment against the tax on the income from capital…  
It follows that the tax legislation at issue in the main proceedings could deter persons who are fully 
taxable in Germany for income tax purposes from investing their capital in companies established 
in other Member States. 
Conversely, that legislation is liable to have a restrictive effect as regards those companies, in that 
it constitutes an obstacle to their raising capital in Germany. Since dividends of non-German 
origin receive less favourable tax treatment than dividends distributed by companies established in 
Germany, the shares of companies established in other Member States are less attractive to 
investors residing in Germany than shares in companies which have their seat in that Member 
State (grounds 22-24, emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Case C-334/02, Commission v France, which we have already seen in connection with 
freedom to provide services, the Court dealt with free movement of capital as follows: 
The legislation in question also has a restrictive effect as regards companies established in other 
Member States as it prevents them from raising capital in France, given that the proceeds of 
contracts taken out with those companies are treated less favourably from a tax point of view than 
proceeds payable by a company which is established in France. This means that their contracts are 
less attractive to investors residing in France than those of companies which are established in that 
Member State (ground 24, emphasis added). 
In other cases, the reference to discrimination as the criterion for the existence of a restriction on 
the free movement of capital is even more explicit. In D. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst
88, the 
Court had to consider a Dutch tax rule which allowed only resident taxpayers a tax-free allowance for 
wealth tax purposes. Mr D was a German resident 10% of whose wealth consisted of real estate 
situated in the Netherlands. The Court interpreted Article 56, banning restrictions on the movement of 
capital, in the light of Article 58 which, as we have seen, makes it clear that Member States may apply 
their tax rules differentiating between resident and non-resident taxpayers in so far as the distinction 
drawn does not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free 
movement of capital (ground 25 of the judgment). The Court went on to examine the differences 
between the situation of a resident and a non-resident taxpayer in the context of wealth tax, and 
concluded that: 
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As in the case of income tax, the view is to be taken as regards wealth tax that the situation of a 
non-resident is different from that of a resident in so far as not only the major part of the latter’s 
income but also the major part of his wealth is normally concentrated in the State where he is 
resident. Consequently, that Member State is best placed to take account of the resident’s overall 
ability to pay by granting him, where appropriate, the allowances prescribed by its legislation. 
It follows that a taxpayer who holds only a minor part of his wealth in a Member State other than 
the State where he is resident is not, as a rule, in a situation comparable to that of residents of that 
other Member State and the refusal of the authorities concerned to grant him the allowance to 
which residents are entitled does not discriminate against him (grounds 37-38, emphasis added). 
The background to Kerckhaert-Morres
89 was a Belgian measure subjecting dividends to a uniform 
tax rate whether they were paid by resident companies or companies resident in another Member State. 
Mr and Mrs Kerckhaert-Morres, who had received dividends from a French company, claimed to be 
taxed less in Belgium in order to take account of the tax which had been deducted at source in France. 
The Court dealt with this claim by pointing out that, under Belgian law, there was no difference in 
treatment according to the source of the dividends (ground 17 of the judgment). It further excluded the 
argument that it amounted to discrimination to treat in the same way dividends received form a 
Belgian company and those paid by a company established in another Member State which also levied 
tax on them. The Court pointed out that the difference in outcome was due simply to the parallel 
exercise by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty (ground 20). The leitmotif of the judgment is 
a search for, and exclusion of, discrimination. 
FII Test Claimants has already been described in relation to freedom of establishment, but it also 
raised a number of issues relating to free movement of capital. In relation to the provision of UK law 
which, as regards resident companies receiving dividends from companies in which they held less than 
10% of the voting rights, reserved exemption from corporation tax to nationally-sourced dividends, the 
Court said: 
Such a difference in treatment has the effect of discouraging United Kingdom-resident companies 
from investing their capital in companies established in another Member State. In addition, it also 
has a restrictive effect as regards companies established in other Member States in that it 
constitutes an obstacle to their raising of capital in the United Kingdom. In so far as income arising 
from foreign-sourced capital is treated less favourably from a tax point of view than dividends 
paid by companies established in the United Kingdom, shares in companies established in other 
Member States are less attractive to United Kingdom-resident investors than those of companies 
having their seat in that Member State …  
It follows that the difference in treatment arising from legislation such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings as regards dividends received by resident companies from non-resident companies in 
which they hold fewer than 10% of the voting rights constitutes a restriction on the free movement 
of capital which is, in principle, prohibited by Article 56 EC (grounds 64-65, emphasis added). 
In relation to the rule according to which a resident company receiving dividends from another 
company which had paid ACT was entitled to a tax credit relating to that payment so that, when it paid 
dividends to its own shareholders, it could offset the ACT already paid against the ACT due on that 
distribution, whereas a company receiving foreign-sourced dividends was obliged to account for ACT 
in full on a subsequent distribution, the Court said: 
It should be noted in that regard that resident companies receiving foreign-sourced dividends are 
treated differently, inasmuch as they suffer a cash-flow disadvantage which is not justified by a 
relevant difference in their situation. 
Such a difference in treatment has the effect of discouraging United Kingdom-resident companies 
from investing their capital in a company established in another Member State and also has a 
restrictive effect as regards companies established in other Member States in that it constitutes an 
obstacle on their part to the raising of capital in the United Kingdom (grounds 96-97, emphasis added). 
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In connection with the provision of national law which stipulated that any relief in respect of tax 
paid abroad given to a resident company receiving foreign-sourced dividends would reduce the 
amount of corporation tax against which it could offset ACT, the Court excluded any breach of the 
Treaty provisions on free movement of capital on the basis that 
such a measure does not discriminate against companies receiving foreign-sourced 
dividends”(ground 128, emphasis added). 
Discrimination Examined Only under Justification Heading 
In several other cases, however, although discrimination is mentioned, this happens convincingly only 
in the context of the examination of the justification of the measure, ie after it has already been 
determined that a “restriction” within the meaning of Article 56 exists, and that the national measure 
in question is therefore in principle unlawful.  
In Blanckaert
90, the measure under consideration was an odd feature of Netherlands law allowing 
certain reductions in social security contributions to be used as tax reductions. This possibility was 
obviously only available to those who were, in principle, liable for social security contributions in the 
Netherlands, ie Netherlands residents working in that Member State or others so working. Mr 
Blanckaert was a Belgian national and resident who owned a holiday home in the Netherlands. He was 
subject to tax there on his notional income from that investment. Not being subject to the Netherlands 
social security system, he could not benefit from the relative tax reduction. He argued that this was an 
unjustified difference in treatment as between residents and non-residents, since his situation was no 
different from that of a Netherlands resident who had only income from savings and investments and 
who therefore did not pay social security contributions. 
In considering whether such a situation gave rise to a restriction on free movement of capital, the 
Court first said: 
It is thus appropriate to examine whether the national rule in question in the main proceedings 
involves a restriction on capital movements between the Member States inasmuch as it has a 
restrictive effect with regard to persons resident in a Member State other than the Netherlands who 
wish to invest in property in that State (ground 36, emphasis added). 
It then went on to note that, under the applicable rules, 
reductions in contributions in respect of national insurance, which, where appropriate, are 
deducted from the tax due on income in the year concerned - of which income from property 
investments is part - are allowed only to taxpayers who are insured under the Netherlands social 
security system. 
The criterion of insurance chosen by the Netherlands legislation favours, in the majority of cases, 
persons resident in that Member State. Taxpayers who are not insured under that system are more 
often than not non-residents. 
Less favourable tax treatment for non-residents only might deter the latter from investing in 
property in the Netherlands. That legislation is therefore capable of hindering the free movement 
of capital (grounds 37-39, emphasis added). 
At first glance, one might think that the various references to differences of treatment in the 
grounds quoted bear witness to a discrimination approach. However, when one analyses more 
carefully what the Court says, the situation is less than clear. In reality, it makes little sense to say that 
less favourable tax treatment for non-residents might deter the latter from investing in the Netherlands: 
is it really credible that someone would hesitate to buy a holiday home in a certain Member State only 
because an advantage enjoyed by locals was not available to him? An investment decision depends 
logically, not on what others enjoy, but on what one’s own options are. If then we accept that the 
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difference in treatment is irrelevant to the “deterrence”, and that the latter seems to be key to the 
Court’s reasoning, we are left with obstacle analysis: a restriction is any measure which might deter an 
investment, irrespective of the relative situation on the national market.  
It is only in examining the possible justification of the national rule that the Court really enters into 
a discussion of unequal treatment, comparing both the treatment and the objective situation of the two 
groups considered. It does this because of the specific wording of Article 58. The Court’s reasoning 
runs as follows: 
It is … necessary to examine whether such a restriction on the free movement of capital may be 
justified in the light of the Treaty provisions. 
In that respect, it is important to note that, under Article 58(1)(a) EC Article 56 shall be without 
prejudice to the right of Member States ... to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which 
distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their place of 
residence ...'. 
However, unequal treatment permitted under Article 58(1)(a) EC must be distinguished from 
arbitrary discrimination, which is prohibited under Article 58(3) EC. According to case-law, a 
national provision such as that at issue in the main proceedings could be regarded as compatible 
with the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of capital provided that the difference in 
treatment applies to situations which are not objectively comparable or is justified by overriding 
reasons in the general interest … 
The question is therefore whether, as regards the grant of tax credits in respect of national 
insurance, there is an objective difference between the objective situation of a non-resident such as 
Mr Blanckaert and that of a resident who, in the same way as the applicant in the main 
proceedings, receives in the Netherlands only income from savings and investments (grounds 40-43). 
The Court goes on to find that there is such a difference, on the basis (largely) that the situation of 
someone who is covered by a social security system is intrinsically distinguishable from that of 
someone who is not. 
The Court’s approach was similar in Bouanich
91. This case concerned Swedish rules on the taxation 
of payments to shareholders on the occasion of a repurchase of shares in connection with a reduction 
in a company’s share capital. The rules differed according to whether the shareholder was a resident or 
a non-resident taxpayer. Only a resident taxpayer could deduct the cost of acquisition of the shares in 
calculating his gain, whereas the non-resident was taxed on the full value of the shares. The Court 
noted the reservation of the more favourable treatment to residents. It went on: 
It is not disputed that such a tax advantage is, for those who enjoy the benefit of it, a form of tax 
relief and has the effect that non-resident shareholders, who are not able to enjoy that advantage, 
are taxed more onerously and therefore find themselves in a less favourable position than resident 
shareholders. 
…the effect of such legislation is to make cross-frontier transfer of capital less attractive both by 
deterring investors who are not resident in Sweden from buying shares in companies resident in 
Sweden and also, consequently, by restricting the opportunities available to Swedish companies to 
raise capital from investors who are not resident in Sweden.  
In those circumstances, it must be held that a refusal to allow a non-resident shareholder, on the 
occasion of a share repurchase, to deduct the cost of acquisition of the shares constitutes a restriction 
on the movement of capital within the meaning of Article 56 EC” (grounds 33-35, emphasis added). 
Like in Blanckaert, therefore, in determining the existence of a restriction, the Court mentions the 
difference in treatment as between the national and the transnational transaction, but appears (at least 
arguably) to give more weight to a deterrence argument which, as we have seen, has little to do with 
discrimination. Only at the justification stage of the analysis does it unambiguously adopt a 
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discrimination approach, noting the difference in treatment (ground 37), and observing that residents 
and non-residents are in a comparable position as regards the cost of acquisition of shares, so that the 
different treatment amounts to arbitrary discrimination (grounds 40-41). 
The same structure may be observed in the judgment in Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer
92 
which concerned a German tax rule limiting an exemption from corporation tax in respect of rental 
income received in its territory to charities liable, in principle, to unlimited tax in Germany, ie 
established in that country. The case arose from the refusal of the German tax authorities to apply the 
exemption to a charitable foundation the seat of which was in Italy, and which had no presence in 
Germany apart from its ownership of commercial property which it let. In considering whether the 
German rule at issue constituted a restriction on the free movement of capital, the Court said the 
following: 
it is necessary to examine whether the application of that article has a restrictive effect on 
charitable foundations established in other Member States in so far as rental income received in 
national territory does not qualify for the exemption enjoyed by other foundations of the same kind 
which have unlimited tax liability in that territory. 
The fact that tax exemption for rental income applies only to charitable foundations which, in 
principle, have unlimited tax liability in Germany places foundations whose seats are in another 
Member State at a disadvantage and may constitute an obstacle to the free movement of capital 
and payments (grounds 26-27, emphasis added).  
As in the other two cases, one has the impression here that the unequal treatment is mentioned as 
interesting background information, but that what really counts for the Court is the “obstacle” put in 
the path of the non-resident, an obstacle, as we have seen, the reality of which is somewhat elusive. 
Again, it is at the stage of examining the justification of the measure that the Court embarks on real 
discrimination exegesis (see ground 32 of the judgment) which leads it to conclude (at ground 42) that 
the effect of the German provision under consideration was “to treat foundations in objectively 
comparable situations differently by reason of their place of residence”, and that the various reasons 
for the unequal treatment put forward by the German Government could not be accepted. 
It can of course be argued that, in all these cases, the discrimination discussion at the justification 
stage of the judgments would not have taken place had there not been a difference in treatment to 
begin with, in other words that the difference in treatment was fundamental to the Court’s finding of a 
restriction. However, the extracts quoted above show that the Court is not content to make a finding of 
different treatment and pass straight on to the examination of its justification; it feels the need to link 
any reference to unequal treatment to a notion of deterrence of, or obstacle to, capital movements 
between Member States
93. The result is, at best, ambiguity as to whether the Court treats a national tax 
measure as a restriction and therefore, in principle, unlawful simply on the basis that it is unattractive 
to investors and not because it treats national and transnational operations differently. 
Doubt as to Criterion for Finding of No Restriction 
This ambiguity of approach is discernible even in cases where the Court finds that the national 
legislation at issue does not constitute a restriction on the free movement of capital. In van Hilten-van 
der Heijden
94 , the national measure giving rise to a reference to the Court of Justice was a Dutch rule 
deeming a Dutch national to be resident in the Netherlands at the time of his/her death where s/he had 
left the Netherlands within the previous ten years. Mrs van Hilten-van der Heijden was a Dutch 
national who had left the Netherlands less than ten years before her death. Her estate included property 
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(moveable and immoveable) in five different countries. Her heirs were disgruntled to find themselves 
assessed to tax in the Netherlands because of the “deeming” rule. In considering whether this rule gave 
rise to a restriction on free movement of capital, the Court first quoted previous judgments to the effect 
that the measures prohibited, as being such restrictions, 
include those which are likely to discourage non-residents from making investments in a Member 
State or to discourage that Member State’s residents to do so in other States or, in the case of 
inheritances, those whose effect is to reduce the value of the inheritance of a resident of a State 
other than the Member State in which the assets concerned are situated and which taxes the 
inheritance of those assets (ground 44, emphasis added). 
It then went on to say that a provision such as the Dutch measure under consideration was not a 
restriction because 
[b]y enacting identical taxation provisions for the estates of nationals who have transferred their 
residence abroad and of those who have remained in the Member State concerned, such legislation 
cannot discourage the former from making investments in that Member State from another State 
nor the latter from doing so in another Member State from the Member State concerned, and, 
regardless of the place where the assets in question are situated, nor can it diminish the value of 
the estate of a national who has transferred his residence abroad (ground 46, emphasis added). 
The meaning of this is not quite clear. The reference to identical tax provisions applying whatever 
the place of residence seems irrelevant: in determining whether a measure might or might not create a 
problem for cross-frontier investments or inheritances, the issue is surely whether the same rule 
applies wherever the property is situated. In any event, the Court’s somewhat complex reasoning 
seems to imply that, had the legislation in question somehow been “discouraging” in relation to cross-
border investments, it would have been a restriction on capital movements irrespective of the situation 
on the purely internal level.  
Synthesis and Conclusion 
A very mixed picture emerges from the foregoing study of the caselaw. There are cases of clear and 
less clear discrimination analysis, judgments relying substantially on ideas of unjustified different 
treatment but nevertheless including “obstacle” language, and at least five cases (Sandoz, Sea-Land, 
Commission v Denmark, Commission v Finland and Commission v Belgium) in which the Court 
deliberately ignored any idea of discrimination in arriving at the conclusion that there was a 
restriction. Had the Court not found the national measures justified in Sandoz and Sea-Land, it would 
have been obliged to declare them unlawful. In the other three cases, it did declare national measures 
unlawful without verifying whether they produced extra effects for a transnational economic 
operation. There is clearly a danger that, if the Court continues to embrace, simultaneously or 
alternatively, discrimination and obstacle analysis, one day it will condemn an entirely neutral tax 
measure which it finds foolish or disproportionate. 
Particularly noticeable is the sense of any lack of definite direction in the Court’s chosen approach. 
This is exemplified by the declaration in Mobistar (8 September 2005) that tax measures affecting in 
exactly the same way national and transnational transactions do not fall within the scope of Article 49, 
followed by the judgment in Commission v Belgium a little more than one year later (9 November 
2006) which ignored any idea of discrimination in finding a Belgian tax measure contrary to that 
provision. Similarly, only two days separate the judgments in Ritter-Coulais (21 February 2006), in 
which the Court based its reasoning explicitly on unjustified different treatment and Commission v 
Finland (23 February 2006) in which it adopted the “obstacle” approach. On a less dramatic level, one 
can compare two judgments handed down on the same day in the field of freedom of establishment: on 
23 february 2006, the Court handed down judgment in Keller, in which it carried out a perfect 
discrimination analysis, and CLT-UFA which, as we have seen above, requires a certain mental effort 
to see that it is in fact about discrimination. The Application of the Fundamental Freedoms to Member State Tax Measures 
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These twists and turns in the caselaw undermine any idea that the Court is now firmly on a 
discrimination track as far as Member State tax measures are concerned
95.
 It is true that two Advocates 
General have firmly advocated a discrimination approach to such measures
96, and that there have been 
a number of judgments recently which could be read as bearing witness to a resurgence of that method 
of reasoning, notably the ACT and FII Test Claimants cases, Denkavit and Meilicke. However, there 
have been false dawns before now and it seems too soon to conclude that the Court has decided 
irrevocably to acknowledge that Member State tax measures should be scrutinized at Community level 
only when they affect differently national and transnational economic operations. It is suggested that 
the time has come for the Court to do this: the study of the cases set out above shows that the result the 
Court seeks to arrive at can always be reached by an approach based on the idea of discrimination, and 
the failure to adopt, consciously and explicitly, such a method of reasoning gives rise to a danger of 
the wrong result being arrived at. It also leads to a lack of clarity and transparency as to the real test 
being applied by the Court. The authority of the Court’s judgments is moreover undermined by the use 
of unconvincing arguments based on “obstacle” analysis. 
The most obvious example of this is the frequent reference to free movement being “hindered” or 
“discouraged” by State measures which are, in reality, unlikely to have any such effect. The problem 
here is that, while the “deterrence” argument is perfectly valid in a case of discrimination against an 
“outward” transaction, where the more favourable treatment reserved to the purely national equivalent 
clearly does have a dissuasive effect on the transnational operation, the same is not true in the 
“inward” situation: where the discrimination consists in favouring nationals over incomers, the 
decision of the latter to carry on with the inward transaction will generally be determined by a 
comparison, not of the two systems offered by the host State, but of the different possibilities available 
to the incomer. In such cases, it would be much more convincing – and quite sufficient – to say that 
the measure in question is unlawful because (without justification) it puts the incoming operation at a 
disadvantage in comparison with an equivalent national transaction. Such discrimination – on grounds 
of nationality or place of establishment – is contrary to the Treaty provisions on the fundamental 
freedoms considered without need of supplementary argument. 
Similarly, a clear “discrimination” approach would allow the Court to avoid the aberrations of 
Sandoz or Sea-Land, where it undertook an examination of the justification of perfectly neutral tax 
measures. In the first case, this led it to distort the nature of the provision examined in order to find it 
justified, and in the other to enter into a discussion of the merits of a system of raising revenue which 
it is hard to see as other than a matter for national legislatures. Under a discrimination approach, on the 
other hand, all the Court has to examine as to its justification is the difference in treatment as between 
the national and transnational situation, and not the wisdom of the basic choices of the national legislator. 
In the area of free movement of capital, the Court seems to have been led towards the “obstacle” 
approach by its reading of Article 58 as derogating from Article 56
97: it seems to reason that, since 
Article 58 permits certain kinds of different treatment in the context of tax law, in derogation from the 
rule of Article 56, therefore the notion of restriction in Article 56 must be wider than the idea of 
different treatment. In Bouanich, it said: 
                                                      
95  In an article published in the October 2007 edition of the Common Market Law Review ("A light in the darkness: Recent 
developments in the ECJ's Direct Tax Jurisprudence"), Suzanne Kingston suggests that the Court has now definitely 
moved to discrimination analysis in direct tax cases. It is submitted, however, that the analysis carried out above rather 
undermines that idea. In any event, an examination of the judgments in both direct and indirect tax cases gives a better 
indication as to whether the Court's caselaw in this area has now become a consistent whole. 
96  A.G. Geelhoed in the ACT and FII Test Claimants cases, cited above in footnotes 47 and 49, and A. G. Poiares Maduro 
in Marks and Spencer, cited above in footnote 49. 
97  This reading has been spelt out repeatedly by the Court. See, eg, Manninen at ground 28 or Centro di Musicologia at 
ground 31. Karen Banks 
46  EUI-WP RSCAS 2007/31 © 2007 Karen Banks 
Article 56 EC prohibits all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States, 
subject to the grounds of justification set out in Article 58 EC (ground 30, emphasis added). 
This, however, is neither the only nor – it is submitted – the best way of reading the relationship 
between the two provisions. Article 58 can better be understood as a guide to undertanding the 
meaning of Article 56 than as a derogation from it. It provides that Article 56 “shall be without 
prejudice to” certain kinds of national measure, ie that it leaves them untouched, so long as they are 
not in reality discriminatory. By reading Article 56 in the light of Article 58, one can bring 
discrimination concerns to the fore from the beginning of the examination of a national measure, 
rather than merely hinting at them in the first part of the reasoning and examining thoroughly the 
possibility of discrimination only in the part of the judgment dealing with justification. A measure 
would thus have to be examined as to its justification only if it affected differently national and 
transnational capital movements. If it did not do so, there would be no need to proceed to an enquiry 
into its justification. Only this reading is compatible with the view that the Treaty provisions on the 
fundamental freedoms, like those specifically dealing with Member State tax measures, interfere with 
such measures only to the extent that they are protectionist. 
One may wonder why the Court seems to hesitate to adopt the approach proposed. The answer 
probably lies, at least in large measure, in the implications this would have for the general 
interpretation of the Treaty provisions on the four freedoms; while it is conceivable in theory to follow 
a discrimination approach for tax measures while sticking to “obstacle” analysis for others, there 
would inevitably be a weakening of the latter approach if the Court were openly to opt for 
discrimination orientation in tax cases. The systemic acknowledgment this would imply of the 
respective spheres of Member State legislation and the Community provisions on the fundamental 
freedoms would raise important questions about the other areas of economic and social legislation in 
which the Member States have also retained their competence under the Treaty system, subject only to 
the possibility of harmonisation at Community level and the prohibitions of discrimination and 
“restrictions” enshrined in the different Treaty provisions. The Court might find it hard to explain why 
the concept of “restriction” had one meaning for tax provisions and another for other kinds of State 
regulation. It is true that not all the arguments which can be deployed in favour of a “discrimination” 
interpretation in the tax area apply in other sectors. However, the basic argument is equally valid: to 
interpret the provisions on the fundamental freedoms as going beyond a ban on protectionist State 
measures is to risk entering into an unwarranted examination of the policy choices made by national 
legislators, thus causing Community law to encroach on areas of competence which the Treaty has 
left, in principle, to the Member States. It is proposed, therefore, that the Court should grasp the nettle 
and do for the other freedoms what it has almost done for the free movement of goods: make 
discrimination the criterion of the existence of a restriction on a fundamental freedom and thus 
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